# The Mythical Man-Month

> An annotated edition of this paper on Fermat's Library, where scientists and readers explain its ideas, equations and history in the margins. Annotated edition: https://fermatslibrary.com/s/the-mythical-man-month

- **Authors:** Frederick Brooks
- **Published:** 1975
- **Topic:** Computer Science
- **Original:** https://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/fermatslibrary/uploads%2F1655779039104-zp1h35fmvg-364316985f23ad31baf6715026064656%2Fmythical_man_month.pdf
- **Pages:** 8
- **Annotations:** 7 comments in 7 threads
- **Featured:** Fermat's Library Journal Club
- **Annotated edition:** https://fermatslibrary.com/s/the-mythical-man-month

## Annotations

### Annotation 1 (page 1)

Beside the passage: “The above is anextract from the Mythical Man-Month by Frederick P. Brooks, Jr., copyright @ 1975 liy Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., Reading, Massachusetts, pages 14-26, 88-94, 153-160, and 177. Reprinted with permission. The extract was prepared by the editors of Datamation and published in Datamation, …”

**Annotation** by João Batalha (2022-06-21):

> This essay is part of a collection of essays published in 1975 by Brooks entitled *The Mythical Man-Month: Essays on Software Engineering*. The book has become one of the most cited works in Software Engineering and to this day, almost 50 years after publishing, it's still required reading in a lot of college courses on Software Engineering.
>
> The idea for writing the book originated from a question that Tom Watson, Jr (CEO of IBM) asked Fred Brooks in an exit interview: “Why is managing software harder than managing hardware development?". Brooks replied: "That's a hard question. I'll go home and think about it." - as a result of that reflection, he wrote *The Mythical Man-Month*.
>
> ![](https://i.imgur.com/YQd3SI0.jpg)

### Annotation 2 (page 1)

Beside the passage: “lack the courteous stubbornness required to make people wait for a good product.”

**Annotation** by João Batalha (2022-06-21):

> Fred Brooks (born in 1931) is an American computer scientist. Brooks earned a Physics degree from Duke University and then joined the newly created degree in computer science at Harvard University where he earned a PhD in 1956. At Harvard he was a student of Howard Aiken, who during WWII developed the Harvard Mark I, the first automatic digital calculator built in the United States.
>
> After graduation Brooks was recruited by IBM. There he would eventually manage the development of OS/360 , the operating system of IBM System/360, a family of mainframe computers introduced in 1964. The Mythical Man-Month describes a lot of the lessons Brooks learned during this project, which was perhaps the largest operating system project of its time.
>
> ![](https://i.imgur.com/WOecNKz.jpg)
> *Fred Brooks*

### Annotation 3 (page 1)

Beside the passage: “Large-system programming has over the past decade been such a tar pit, and many great and powerful beasts have thrashed violen~ly in it. Most have emerged with running systems-few have met goals, schedules, and budgets. Large and small, massive or wiry, team after team has become entangled in the tar. No one thing …”

**Annotation** by João Batalha (2022-06-21):

> According to a McKinsey-Oxford study, 1/3 of all large software projects (defined as those with initial budgets exceeding $15M) are delivered late ([full study](https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/client_service/BTO/PDF/MOBT_27_Delivering_large-scale_IT_projects_on_time_budget_and_value.ashx)).
> ![](https://i.imgur.com/zisCf6K.png)

### Annotation 4 (page 2)

Beside the passage: “Maker, divides creative activity into three stages: the idea, the implementation, and the interaction. A book, then, or a computer, or a program comes into existence first as an ideal construct, built outside time and space but complete in the mind of the author. It is realized in time and space by pen, ink, and …”

**Annotation** by João Batalha (2022-06-21):

> The formula $\frac{n(n-1)}{2}$ represents the number of all possible distinct pairs in a set of $n$ elements.

### Annotation 5 (page 2)

Beside the passage: “Maker, divides creative activity into three stages: the idea, the implementation, and the interaction. A book, then, or a computer, or a program comes into existence first as an ideal construct, built outside time and space but complete in the mind of the author. It is realized in time and space by pen, ink, and …”

**Annotation** by João Batalha (2022-06-21):

> This is one of the cornerstones of modern software development methodologies such as Agile development.

### Annotation 6 (page 2)

Beside the passage: “V. S. Vyssotsky of Bell Telephone Laboratories estimates that a large project can sustain a manpower build- Men up of 30% per year- More than that Fig. 3. since software construction is strains and even inhibits the evolution complex, the communications overhead of the essential informal structure and is great. Adding …”

**Annotation** by João Batalha (2022-06-21):

> Victor Vyssotsky was a mathematician and computer scientist. He was a technical head of the Multics project at Bell Labs. Multics, would go on to heavily influence virtually all modern operating systems - Ken Thompson was directly inspired by it to develop Unix.

### Annotation 7 (page 5)

Beside the passage: “He found his programming teams missing schedules by about one-halfeach job was taking approximately twice as long as estimated. The estimates were very careful, done by experienced teams estimating man-hours for several hundred subtasks on a PERT chart. When the slippage pattern appeared, he asked them to keep careful …”

**Annotation** by João Batalha (2022-06-21):

> PERT stands for Program Evaluation and Review Technique. It provides a visual representation of a project's timeline and breaks down individual tasks.
> ![](https://i.imgur.com/2dItaFl.png)

## Full text

Extracted from the PDF. [Annotation N] marks where each annotation above sits.

#### Page 1

THE MYTHICAL

MAN-MONTH

The [Annotation 1] above is anextract from the Mythical Man-Month by Frederick P. Brooks, Jr., copyright @ 1975 liy Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., Reading, Massachusetts, pages 14-26, 88-94, 153-160, and 177. Reprinted with permission. The extract was prepared by the editors of Datamation and published in Datamation, December 1974, pages 44-52.

NO SCENE FROM PREHISTORY is quite so vivid as that of the mortal struggles of great beasts in the tar pits. In the mind's eye one sees dinosaurs, mammoths, and saber-toothed tigers struggling against the grip of the tar. The fiercer the struggle, the more entangling the tar, and no beast is so strong or so skillful but that he ultimately sinks.

Large-system programming has over the past decade been such a tar pit, and many great and powerful beasts have thrashed [Annotation 3] violen~ly in it. Most have emerged with running systems-few have met goals, schedules, and budgets. Large and small, massive or wiry, team after team has become entangled in the tar. No one thing seems to cause the difficulty-any particular paw can be pulled away. But the accumulation of simultaneous and interacting factors brings slower and slower motion. Everyone seems to have been surprised by the stickiness of the problem, and it is hard to discern-the nature of it. But we must try to understand it if we are to solve it.

More software projects have gone awry for lack of calendar time than for all other causes combined. Why is this case of disaster so common?

First, our techniques of estimating are poorly developed. More seriously, they reflect an unvoiced assumption which is quite untrue, i.e., that all will go well.

Second, our estimating techniques fallaciously confuse effort with progress, hiding the assumption that men and months are interchangeable.

Third, because we are uncertain of our estimates, software managers often

HOW DOES A PROJECT GET TO

BEAYEAR LATE? . . . . . . ONE DAY AT A TIME.

By Frederick P. Brooks, Jr.

lack the courteous stubbornness re- [Annotation 2] quired to make people wait for a good product.

Fourth, schedule progress is poorly monitored. Techniques proven and routine in other engineering disciplines are considered radical innovations in software engineering.

Fifth, when schedule slippage is recognized, the natural (and traditional) response is to add manpower. Like dousing a fire with gasoline, this makes matters worse, much worse. More fire requires more gasoline and thus begins a regenerative cycle which ends in disaster.

Schedule monitoring will be covered later. Let us now consider other aspects of the problem in more detail.

Optimism

All programmers are optimists. Perhaps this modern sorcery especially attracts those who believe in happy endings and fairy godmothers. Perhaps the hundreds of nitty frustrations drive away all but those who habitually focus on the end goal. Perhaps it is merely that computers are young, programmers are younger, and the young are always optimists. But however the selection process works, the result is indisputable: "This time it will surely run," or "I just found the last bug." So the first false assumption that underlies the scheduling of systems programming is that all will go well, i.e., that each task will take only as long as it "o~ghi" to take. The pervasiveness of optimism among programmers deserves more than a flip analysis. Dorothy Sayers, in her excellent book, The Mind of the

#### Page 2

Maker, divides creative activity into three stages: the idea, the implementation, and the interaction. A book, then, or a computer, or a program comes into existence first as an ideal construct, built outside time and space but complete in the mind of the author. It is realized in time and space by pen, ink, and paper, [Annotation 4] or by wire, silicon, and ferrite. The creation is complete when someone reads the book, uses the computer or runs the program, thereby interacting with the mind of the maker This description, which Miss Sayers uses to illuminate not only human creative activity but also the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, will help us in our present task. For the human makers [Annotation 5] of things, the incompletenesses and inconsistencies of our ideas become clear only during implementation. Thus it is that writing, experimentation, "working out" are essential disciplines for the theoretician.

In many creative activities the medium of execution is intractable. Lumber splits; paints smear; electrical circuits ring. These physicad limitations of the medium constrain the ideas that may be expressed, and they also create unexpected diicultie:~ in the irnplementation.

Implementation, then, takes time and sweat both because of the physical media and because of the inadequacies of the underlying ideas. We tend to blame the physical media for most of our implementation difficulties; for the media are not "oui-s" in the way the ideas are, and our pride colors our judgment.

Computer programming, however, creates with an exceedingly tractable medium. The progrsimmer builds from

the product of the number of men and the number of months. Progress does not. Hence the man-month as a unit for measuring the size of a job is a dangerous and deceptive myth. It implies that men and months are interchangeable.

Men and months are interchangeable commodities only when a task can be partitioned among many workers with no communication among them (Fig. 1 ) . This is true of reaping wheat or picking cotton; it is not even approximately true of systems programming.

When a task cannot be partitioned

Men Fig. 1. The term "man-month" implies that if one man takes 10 months to do a job, 10 men can do it in one month. This may be true of picking cotton.

because of sequential constraints, the application of more effort has no effect on the schedule. The bearing of a child takes nine months, no matter how many women are assigned. Many software tasks have this characteristic because of the sequential nature of de-

Corbat6 of MIT points out that a long project must anticipate a turnover of 20% per year, and new people must be both technically trained and integrated into the formal structure.

Intercommunication is worse. If each part of the task must be separately coordinated with each other part, the effort increases as n(n-1) / 2. Three workers require three times as much pairwise intercommunication as two; four require six times as much as two. If, moreover, there need to be conferences among three, four, etc., workers to resolve things jointly, matters get worse yet. The added effort of communicatine mav fullv counteract the division of the original task and bring us hack to the situation of Fig. 3. Since software construction is inherently a systems effort-an exercise in complex interrelationships-communication effort is great, and it quickly

Men pure thought-stuff: concepts and very buggidg.

Fig. 2. Even on tasks that can be nicely flexible representatlions thereof. Be- In tasks that an be partitioned but partitioned among people, the additional cause the medium is tractable, we exwhich require ~~mn~unication among communication required adds to the topect few difficulties nn implementation; thesubtask% the effort of ~~~municatal work, increasing the schedule. hence our pervasive optimism. Because tion must be added to the amount of our ideas are faulty, we have bugs; hence our optimism is unjustified.

In a single task, the assumption that all will go well has a probabilistic effect on the schedule. It night indeed go as planned, for there is a probability distribution for the delay that will be encountered, and "no delay" has a finite probability. A large programming effort, however, consisits of many tasks, some chained end-to-end. The probability that each will go well becomes vanishingly small.

The mythical man-month The second fallacious thought mode is expressed in the very unit of effort used in estimating and scheduling: the man-month. Cost docs indeed vary as

work to be done. Therefore the best that can be done is somewhat poorer than an even trade of men for months (Fig. 2). The added burden of communication is made up of two parts, training and intercommunication. Each worker must be trained in the technology, the goals of the effort, the overall strategy, and the plan of work. This training cannot be partitioned, so this part of the added effort varies linearly with the number of workers.

V. S. Vyssotsky of Bell Telephone Laboratories estimates that a large [Annotation 6] project can sustain a manpower build- Men up of 30% per year- More than that Fig. 3. since software construction is strains and even inhibits the evolution complex, the communications overhead of the essential informal structure and is great. Adding more men can lengthen, its communication pathways. F. J. rather than shorten, the schedule.

#### Page 3

dominates the dec-ease in individual task time brought iboiit by partitioning. Adding more nen then lengthens, not shortens, the schedule.

Systems test

No parts of the schedule are so thoroughly affected by sequential constraints as component debugging and system test. Furthermore, the time required depends or the number and subtlety of the errors encountered. Theoretically this number should be zero. Because of optimism, we usually expect the number if bugs to be smaller than it turns oi t to be. Therefore testing is usually tlie most mis-scheduled part of programming.

For some years I have been successfully using the following rule of thumb for scheduling a software task:

% planning 36 coding % component tert and earIy system test

% system test, all components in hand.

This differs from conventional scheduling in several important ways: 1. The fraction devoted to planning is larger than normal. Even so, it is barely enough to produce a de-

of the schedule. In examining conventionally scheduled projects, I have found that few allowed one-half of the projected schedule for testing, but that most did indeed spend half of the actual schedule for that purpose. Many of these were on schedule until and except in system testing.

Failure to allow enough time for system test, in particular, is peculiarly disastrous. Since the delay comes at the end of the schedule, no one is aware of schedule trouble until almost the delivery date. Bad news, late and without warning, is unsettling to customers and to managers.

Furthermore, delay at this point has unusually severe financial, as well as psychological, repercussions. The project is fully staffed, and cost-perday is maximum. More seriously, the software is to support other business effort (shipping of computers, operation of new facilities, etc.) and the secondary costs of delaying these are very high, for it is almost time for software shipment. Indeed, these secondary costs may far outweigh all others. It is therefore very important to allow enough system test time in the original schedule.

two choices~wait or eat it raw. Software customers have had the same choices.

The cook has another choice; he can turn up theheat. The result is often an omelette nothing can save-burned in one part, raw in another.

Now I do not think software managers have less inherent courage and firmness than chefs, nor than other engineering managers. But false scheduling to match the patron's desired date is much more common in our discipline than elsewhere in engineering. It is very difficult to make a vigorous, plausible, and job-risking defense of an estimate that is derived by no quantitative method, supported by littie data, and certified chiefly by the hunches of the managers.

Clearly two solutions are needed. We need to develop and publicize productivity figures, bug-incidence figures, estimating rules, and so on. The whole profession can only profit from sharing such data.

Until estimating is on a sounder basis, individual managers will need to stiffen their backbones, and defend their estimates with the assurance that their poor hunches are better than wishderived estimates.

Fig. 4. Adding manpower to a project which is late may not help. In this case, suppose three men on a 12 nan-month project were a month late. If it takes one of the three an extra month to t-ain two new men, the project will be just as late as if no one was added.

5*-

4

3 C'

g

2

1

0

tailed and soliii specification, and not enough to include research or exploration of totally new techniques. 2. The half of the schedule devoted to debugging of completed code is much larger than normal. 3. The part that is easy to estimate, i.e., coding, is ,given only one-sixth

i--- 1-1Ã‘IÃ

Regenerative disaster

V

D

What does one do when an essential I software project is behind schedule? I I

Add manpower, naturally. As Figs. 1 -

I through 3 suggest, this may or may not

I help. I Let us consider an example. Suppose I Training a task is estimated at 12 man-months -. A complete and assigned to three men for four A months, and that there are measurable mileposts A, B, C, D, which are sched- - uled to fall at the end of each month.

Now suppose the first milepost is not reached until two months have elapsed. 5 programmers What are the alternatives facing the - for 7+ mlm manager? 1. Assume that the task must be done on time. Assume that only the first 1 I 1 1 I I I 1 part of the task was misestimated.

Gutless estimating

Observe that for the programmer, as for the chef, the urgency of the patron may govern the scheduled completion of the task, but it cannot govern the actual completion. An omelette, promised in ten minutes, may appear to be progressing nicely. But when it has not set in ten minutes, the customer has

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Then 9 man-months of effort remain, and two months, so 4% men Months will be needed. Add 2 men to the 3 assigned. 2. Assume that the task must be done on time. Assume that the whole estimate was uniformly low. Theft 18 man-months of effort remain, and two months, so 9 men will be needed. Add 6 men to the 3 assigned. 3. Reschedule. In this case, I like the advice given by an experienced hardware engineer, 'Take no small slips." That is, allow enough time in the new schedule to ensure that the work can be carefully and

#### Page 4

thoroughly done, and that rescheduling will not have to be done again. 4. Trim the task. In practice this tends to happen anyway, once the team observes schedule slippage. Where the secondary costs of delay are very high, this; is the only feasible action. The manager's only alternatives are to trim it formally and carefully, to reschedule, or to watch the task get silently trimmed by hasty design and incomplete testing. In the first two cases, insisting that the unaltered task be completed in four months is disastrous. Consider the regenerative effects, for example, for the first alternative (Fig. 4 preceding page). The two new men, however competent and however quickly recruited, will require training in the bisk by one of the experienced men. If this takes a month, 3 man-months will have been devoted to work not in the original estimate. Furthermore, the task originally partitioned three ways, must be repartitioned into five parts, hence some work already done will be lost and system testing must be lengthened. So at the end of the third month, substantially more than 7 man-months of effort remain, and 5 trained people and one month are available. As Fig. 4 suggests, the product is just as late as if no one had been added.

To hope to get done in four months, considering only training time and not repartitioning and extra systems test, would require adding 4 men, not 2, at the end of the second month. To cover repartitioning and system test effects, one would have to add still other men. Now. however, one has at least a 7- man team. not a 3-man one; thus such aspects as team organization and task division are different in kind, not merely in degree.

Notice that by the end of the third month things look very black. The March 1 milestone has not been reached in spite of all the managerial effort. The temptation is very strong to repeat the cycle, adding; yet more manpower. Therein lies madness.

The foregoing assumed that only the first milestone was misestimated. If on March 1 one makes tile conservative assumption that the whole schedule was optimistic one wants to add 6 men just to the original task Calculation of the training, repartitioning, system testing effects is left as an exercise for the reader. Without a doubt, the ,regenerative disaster will yield a poorer product later, than would rescheduling with the original three men, unaugmented.

Oversimplifying outrageously, we

state Brooks' Law: one-sixth or so of the problem, and errors in its estimate or in the ratios Adding manpower to a late software project makes it later. could lead to ridiculous results.

Second, one must say that data for This then is the demythologizing of the man-month. The number of months of a project depends upon its sequential constraints. The maximum number of men depends upon the number of independent subtasks. From these two quantities one can derive schedules using fewer men and more months. (The only risk is product obsolescence.) One cannot, however, get workable schedules using more men and fewer months. More software projects have gone awry for lack of calendar time than for all other causes combined.

Calling the shot How long will a system programming job take? How much effort will be required? How does one estimate?

I have earlier suggested ratios that seem to apply to planning time, coding, component test, and system test. First, one must say that one does not estimate the entire task by estimating the coding portion only and then applying the ratios. The coding is only

building isolated small programs are not applicable to programming systems products. For a program averaging about 3,200 words, for example, Sackman, Erikson, and Grant report an average code-plusdebug time of about 178 hours for a single programmer, a figure which would extrapolate to give an annual productivity of 35,800 state ments per year. A program half that size took less than one-fourth as long, and extrapolated productivity is almost 80,000 statements per year.t1J. Planning, documentation, testing, system integration, and training times must be added. The linear extrapolation of such spring figures is meaningless. Extrapolation of times for the hundredyard dash shows that a man can run a mile in under three minutes.

Before dismissing them, however, let us note that these numbers, although not for strictly comparable problems, suggest that effort goes as a power of size even when no communication is involved except that of a man with his memories.

Thousands of machine instructions Fig. 5. As a project's complexity increases, the number of man-months required to complete it goes up exponentially.

#### Page 5

Fig. 5 tells the sad story. It illustrates results reported from a study done by Nanus and Farrl21 at System Development Corp. This shows an exponent of 1.5; that is, effort = (constant)x(nuniber of instructions)l~~ Another SDC study reported by Weinwunnt31 also shows an exponent near 1.5.

A few studies on programmer productivity have been nade, and several

Operational

Maintenance

Compiler

Translator (Data assembler)

Prog. units

50

36

13

15

Number of programmers

estimating techniques have been proposed. Morin has prepared a survey of the published data.[*] Here I shall give only a few items that seem especially illuminating.

Portman's data Charles Portman, manager of ICL'S Software Div., Computer Equipment Organization (Northwest) at Manchester, offers another useful personal

Words/ man-yr.

Table 1. Data from l3ell Labs indicates productivity differences between complex problems (the first two are basically control programs with many modules) and less complex ones. No ore is certain how much of the difference is due to complexity, how much to the number of people involved.

Mar Jun Sep Dec Mar Jun Sep Dec

Fig. 6. Bell Labs' expt rience in predicting programming effort on one project.

insight.

He found his programming teams missing schedules by about one-halfeach job was taking approximately twice as long as estimated. The estimates were very careful, done by experienced teams estimating man-hours [Annotation 7] for several hundred subtasks on a PERT chart. When the slippage pattern appeared, he asked them to keep careful daily logs of time usage. These showed that the estimating error could be entirely accounted for by the fact that his teams were only realizing 50% of the working week as actual programming and debugging time. Machine downtime, higher-priority short unrelated jobs, meetings, paperwork, company business, sickness, personal time, etc. accounted for the rest. In short, the estimates made an unrealistic assumption about the number Of technical work hours per man-year. My own experience quite confirms his conclusion.

An unpublished 1964 study by E. F. Bardaii shows programmers realizing only 27% productive time.161

Aron's data Joel Aron, manager of Systems Technology at IBM in Gaithersburg, Maryland, has studied programmer productivity when working on nine large systems (briefly, large means more than 25 programmers and 30,- 000 deliverable instructions). He divides such systems according to interactions among programmers (and systern parts) and finds productivities as follows :

Very few interactions 10000 instructions per man-year Some interactions 5,000 Many interactions 1,500

The man-years do not include sup* port and system test activities, only design and programming. When these figures are diluted by a factor of two to cover system test, they closely match Harr's data.

50 Hair's data John Harr, manager of program- (/) u ming for the Bell Telephone Laborac 40 tories' Electronic Switching System, s 3 reported his and others' experience in a o paper at the 1969 Spring Joint Com- 5 30 c .- puter Conference.[*] These data are V) shown in Table 1 and Figs. 6 and 7 .

20 Of these, Fig. 6 is the most detailed 3 and the most useful. The first two jobs are basically control programsethe sec- 10 ond two are basically language translators. Productivity is stated in terms of debugged words per man-year. This in- 0 cludes programming, component test, Mar Jun Sep Dec Mar Jun sep and system test. It is not clear how Fig. 7. Bell's predictions for debugging rates on a single project, contrasted with much of the planning effort, or effort actual figures. in machine support, writing, and the

#### Page 6

like, is included.

The productivities likewise fall into two classifications: those for control programs are about 600 words per man-year; those for translators are about 2,200 words per man-year. Note that all four programs are of similar size-the variation is in size of the work groups, length of time, and number of modules. Which is cause and which is effect? Did the control programs require more people because they were more complicated? Or did they require more modules and more man-months because they were assigned more people? Did they take longer because of thi; greater complexity, or because more people were assigned? One can't be sure. The control programs were surely more complex. These uncertainties aside, the numbers describe the real productivities achieved on a large 5ystem. using present-day programming techniques. As such they are a real contribution.

Figs. 6 and 7 show some interesting data on programming and debugging rates as compared to predicted rates.

OSl360 data IBM os/360 experience, while not available in the detail of Harr's data, confirms it. Product ivities in range of 600-800 debugged instructions per man-year were experienced by control program groups. Productivities in the 2,000-3,000 debugged instructions per man-year were achieved by language translator groups. Tliese include planning done by the gr,~up, coding component test, system test, and some support activities. They ,ire comparable to Harr's data, so far as I can tell. Aron's data, Hanm's data, and the 0~1360 data all confirm striking differences in productivity related to the complexity and difficulty of the task itself. My guideline in the morass of estimating complexity is that compilers are three times as bail as normal batch application programs, and operating systems are three times as bad as compilers.

Corbato's data

Both Harr's data and os/360 data are for assembly language programming. Little data seem to have been published on system programming productivity using higher-level languages. Corbat6 of MIT'S Project MAC reports, however, a mean productivity of 1,200 lines of debugged PL/I statements per man-year on the MULTICS system (between 1 and 2 million words) I71 This number is very exciting. Like the other projects, MULTICS includes control programs and language transla-

tors. Like the others, it is producing a system programming product, tested and documented. The data seem to be comparable in terms of kind of effort included. And the productivity number is a good average between the control program and translator productivities of other projects.

But Corbat6's number is lines per man-year, not words! Each statement in his system corresponds to about three-to-five words of handwritten code! This suggests two important con. clusions : Productivity seems constant in terms of elementary statements, a conclusion that is reasonable in terms of the thought a statement requires and the errors it may include. Programming productivity may be increased as much as five times when a suitable high-level language is used. To back up these conclusions, W. M. Taliaffero also reports a constant productivity of 2,400 statements/year in Assembler, FOR- TRAN, and COBOL.~ E. A. Nelson has shown a 340-1 productivity improvement for high-level language, although his standard deviations are wide.Pl

Hatching a catastrophe

When one hears of disastrous schedule slippage in a project, he imagines that a series of major calamities must have befallen it. Usually, however, the disaster is due to termites, not tornadoes; and the schedule has slipped imperceptibly but inexorably. Indeed, major calamities are easier to handle; one responds with major force, radical reorganization, the invention of new approaches. The whole team rises to the occasion.

But the day-byday slippage is harder to recognize, harder to prevent, harder to make up. Yesterday a key man was sick, and a meeting couldn't be held. Today the machines are all down, because lightning struck the building's power transformer. Tomorrow the disc routines won't start testing, because the first disc is a week late from the factory. Snow, jury duty, family problems, emergency meetings with customers, executive audits-the list goes on and on. Each one only postpones some activity by a halfday or a day. And the schedule slips, one day at a time.

How does one control a big project on a tight schedule? The first step is to have a schedule. Each of a list of events, called milestones, has a date. Picking the dates is an estimating problem, discussed already and crucially dependent on experience.

For picking the milestones there is

only one relevant rule. Milestones must be concrete, specific, measurable events, defined with knife-edge sharpness. Coding, for a counterexample, is "90% finished" for half of the total coding time. Debugging is "99% complete" most of the time. "Planning complete" is an event one can proclaim almost at will.[l01 Concrete milestones, on the other hand, are 100% events. "Specifications signed by architects and implementem," "source coding 100% complete, keypunched, entered into disc library," "debugged version passes all test cases." These concrete milestones demark the vague phases of planning, coding, debugging.

It is more important that milestones be sharp-edged and unambiguous than that they be easily verifiable by the boss. Rarely will a man lie about mile-

None love

the bearer of bad news.

Sophocles

stone progress, if the milestone is so sharp that he can't deceive himself. But if the milestone is fuzzy, the boss often understands a different report from that which the man gives. To supplement Sophocles, no one enjoys bearing bad news, either, so it gets softened without any real intent to de- CLceive.

Two interesting studies of estimating behavior by government contractors on large-scale development projects show that: 1. Estimates of the length of an activity made and revised carefully every two weeks before the activity starts do not significantly change as the start time draws near, no matter how wrong they ultimately turn out to be. , 2. During the activity, overestimates of duration come steadily down as the activity proceeds. 3. Underestimates do not change significantly during the activity until about three weeks before the scheduled completion.[11] I( Sharp milestones are in fact a service to the te&m, and one they can properly expect from a manager. The fuzzy milestone is the harder burden to live with. It is in fact a millstone that grinds down morale, for it deceives one about lost time until it is irremediable. And chronic schedule slippage is a morale-killer.

"The other piece is latew A schedule slips a day; so what? Who gets excited about a one-day slip? We can make it up later. And the other piece ours fits into is late anyway.

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A baseball manager recognizes a nonphysical talent, hustle, as an essential gift of greal players and great teams. It is the chiiracteristic of, running faster than necessary, moving sooner than necessary, trying harder than necessary. It is essential for great programming team:;, too. Hustle provides the cushion, the reserve capacity, that enables a team to cope with routine mishaps, to ant cipate and forfend minor calamities. The calculated response, the measui ed effort, are the wet blankets that dampen hustle. As we have seen, one must get excited about a one-day slip. Such are the elements of catastrophe.

But not all one-dily slips are equally disastrous. So some calculation of response is necessary though hustle be dampened. How does one tell which slips matter? There is no substitute for a PERT chart or a critical-path schedule. Such a network shows who waits for what. It shows who is on the critical path, where any slip moves the end date. It also shaws how much an activity can slip bei'ore it moves into the critical path.

The PERT technique, strictly speaking, is an elaboration of critical-path scheduling in which one estimates three times for every event, times corresponding to different probabilities of

meeting the estimated dates. I do not find this refinement to be worth the extra effort, but for brevity I will call any critical path network a PERT chart. The preparation of a PERT chart is the most valuable part of its use. Laying out the network, identifying the dependencies, and estimating the legs all force a great deal of very specific planning very early in a project. The first chart is always terrible, and one invents and invents in making the second one.

As the project proceeds, the PERT chart provides the answer to the demoralizing excuse, "The other piece is late anyhow." It shows how hustle is needed to keep one's own part off the critical path, and it suggests ways to make up the lost time in the other part.

Under the rug

When a first-line manager sees his small team slipping behind, he is rarely inclined to run to the boss with this woe. The team might be able to make it up, or he should be able to invent or reorganize to solve the problem. Then why worry the boss with it? So far, so good. Solving such problems is exactly what the first-line manager is there for. And the boss does have enough real worries demanding his action that

SYSTEM/360 SUMMARY STATUS REPORT 05/369 LANGUAGE PROCESSORS + SERVICE PROGRAMS AS OF FEBRUARY 01 1965

C MMITMNT OBJECTIVE SPECS ANNOUNCE AVAI BLE AVAILABLE PROJECT LOCATION RELEASE APPROVED APPROVED OPERATING SYSTEM

12K DESIGN LEVEL (E)

ASSEMBLY SAN JOSE 04/--/4 10/28/4 C 10/13/4 C 12/31/5 01/11/5 FORTRAN POK 04/--/4 C 10/28/4 C 10/21/4 C 12/31/5 01/22/5 COBOL ENDICOTT 04/--/4 C 10/25/4 C 10/15/4 C 12/31/5 01/20/5 A RPG SAN JOSE 04/--/4 C 10/28/4 C 09/30/4 C 12/31/5 01/05/5 A UTILITIES TIMWLIFE 04/--/4 C 06/24/4 C 12/31/5 SORT 1 POK 04/--/4 C 10/28/4 C 10/19/4 C

12/31/5 01/11/5 SORT 2 POK 04/--/4 C 10/28/4 C 10/19/4 C 06/30/6 01/11/5 44K DESIGN LEVEL (F)

ASSEMBLY SAN JOSE 04/--/4 C 10/28/4 C 10/13/4 C 12/31/5 01/11/5 COBOL TIMWLIFE 04/--/4 C 10/28/4 C 10/15/4 C

06/30/6 01/20/5 A NPL HURSLEY 04/--/4 C 10/28/4 C

03/31/6 2250 KINGSTON 03/30/4 C 11/05/4 C 10/06/4 C 03/31/6 01/04/5 2280 KINGSTON 06/30/4 C 11/05/4 C 09/30/6 200K DESIGN LEVEL (HI

ASSEMBLY TIMWLIFE 10/28/4 C FORTRAN POK 04/--/4 C 10/28/4 C 10/16/4 C 06/30/6 01/11/5 NPL HURSLEY 04/--/4 C 10/28/4 C NPL H POK 041--14 C 03/30/4 C

Fig. 8. A report showing milestones and status in a key document in project control. This one shows some problems in OS development: specifications approval is late on some items

he doesn't seek others. So all the dirt gets swept under the rug.

But every boss needs two kinds of information, exceptions for action and a status picture for education.[12] For that purpose he needs to know the status of all his teams. Getting a true picture of that status is hard.

The first-line manager's interests and those of the boss have an inherent conflict here. The first-line manager fears that if he reports his problem, the boss will act on it. Then his action will preempt the manager's function, diminish his authority, foul up his other plans. So as long as the manager thinks he can solve,it alone, he doesn't tell the boss.

Two rug-lifting techniques are open to the boss. Both must be used. The first is to reduce the role conflict and inspire sharing of status. The other is to yank the rug back.

Reducing the role conflict

The boss must first distinguish between action information and status information. He must discipline himself not to act on problems his managers can solve, and never to act on problems when he is explicitly reviewing status. I once knew a boss who invariably picked up the phone to give orders before the end of the first para-

= REVISED PLANNED DATE NE=NOT ESTABLISHED SRL ALPHA TEST COMP TEST SYS TEST BULLETIN BETA TEST AVAILABLE ENTRY START START AVAILABLE ENTRY APPROVED EXIT COMPLETE COMPLETE APPROVED EXIT

11/11/4 C 02/15/5 03/01/6 12/10/4 A 03/22/5 05/30/6

07/--/5 01/--/7 02/01/5 10/15/5 04/01/5 12/15/5 (those without "A"); documentation (SRL) approval is overdue on another; and one (2250 support) is late coming out of alpha test.

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graph in a status report. That response is guaranteed to squelch full disclosure. Conversely, when the manager knows his boss will accept status reports without panic or preemption, he comes to give honest appraisals.

This whole process is helped if the boss labels meetings, reviews, conferences, as status-review meetings versus problem-action meetings, and controls himself accordingly. Obviously one may call a problem-action meeting as a consequence of a status meeting, if he believes a problem is out of hand. But at least everybody knows what the score is. and the boss thinks twice before grabbing th i ball.

Yanking the nig off Nevertheless, it is necessary to have review techniques by which the true status is made known, whether cooperatively or not. The PERT chart with its frequent sharp milestones is the basis for such review. On a large project one may want to review some part of it each week, making the rounds once a month or so.

A report showing milestones and actual completions is the key document. Fig. 8 (precedini; page), shows an excerpt from such a report. This report shows some troutiles. Specifications approval is overdue on several corn$ nents. Manual (SRL) approval is overdue on another, ind one is late getting out of the first jtate (ALPHA) of the independently co iducted product test. So such a report serves as an agenda for the meeting of 1 February. Everyone knows the questions, and the component manager should be prepared to explain why it's ate, when it will be finished, what strps he's taking, and what help, if any, he needs from the boss or collateral groups. V. Vyssotsky of Bell Telephone Laboratories adds the following observation:

1 have found it handy to carry both "scheduled" and 'estimated" dates in the milestone retort. The scheduled dates are the property of the project manager and represent a consistent work plan for the project as a whole, and one which is ii priori a reasonable plan. The estimate~i dates are the property of the lowest level manager who has cognizance over the piece of work tn question, and represents his best judgment as to when if will actually happen, given thr resources he has available and when he received (or has commitments for delivery of) his prerequisite inputs. The project manager has to keep his fingers off the estimated dates, and put the tmphasis on getting accurate, unbiased estimates rather

than palatable optimistic estimates or self-protective conservative ones. Once this is clearly established in everyone's mind, the project manager can see quite a ways into the future where he is going to be in trouble if he doesn't do something.

The preparation of the PERT chart is a function of the boss and the managers reporting to him. Its updating, revision, and reporting requires the attention of a small (one-to-three-man) staff group which serves as an extension of the boss. Such a "Plans and Controls" team is invaluable for a large project. It has no authority except to ask all the line managers when they will have set or changed milestones, and whether milestones have been met. Since the Plans and Controls group handles all the paperwork, the burden on the line managers is reduced to the essentials-making the decisions.

We had a skilled, enthusiastic, and diplomatic Plans and Controls group on the os/360 project, run by A. M. Pietrasanta, who devoted considerable inventive talent to devising effective but unobtrusive control methods. As a result, I found his group to be widely respected and more than tolerated. For a group whose role is inherently that of an irritant, this is quite an accomplishment.

The investment of a modest amount of skilled effort in a Plans and Controls function is very rewarding. It makes far more difference in project accomplishment than if these people worked directly on building the product programs. For the Plans and Controls group is the watchdog who renders the imperceptible delays visible and' who points up the.critical elements. It is the early'warning system against losing a year, one day at a time.

Epilogue

The tar pit of software engineering will continue to be sticky for a long time to come. One can expect the human race to continue attempting systems just within or just beyond our reach; and software systems are perhaps the most intricate and comvlex of man's handiworks. The management of this complex craft will demand our best use of new languages and systems, our best adaptation of proven engineering management methods, liberal doses of common sense, and a Godgiven humility to recognize our fallibility and limitations.

References 1. Sacknm, H., W. I. Erikson, and E. E. Grant, "Exploratory Experimentation Studies Comparing Online and Offline Programming Perfonnance." Communications of the ACM, 11 (1968). 3-11.

2. Nanus, B., and L. Farr, "Some Cost Contrite utors to Large-Sole-Programs," AFIPS Proceedinga, SJCC, 25 (1964), 239-248. 3. Weinwurm, G. F., Research hi the Mana#ement of Computer Programmiw. Report SP- 2059, 1965, System Development Corp., Santa Monica. 4. Morin, L. H., Estimation of Resources for Computer Programming Projects, M. S. thesis, Univ. of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1974. 5. Quoted by D. B. Mayer and A. W. Stalnaker. Â¥"Selectio and Evaluation of Computer Personnel," Proceedings 23 ACM Conference, 1968.661. 6. Paper given at a panel session and not included in the AFIPS Proceedings. 7. Corbat6. F. I., Sensitive Issues in the Desitn of Multi-Use Systems. Lecture at the opening of the Honeywell EDP Technology Center, 1968. 8. Taliaffcro, W. M.. "Modularity the Key to System Growth Potential," Software, 1 (1971). 245-257. 9. Nelson, E. A., Management Handbook for the Estimation of Computei Protramming Costs. Report TM-3225, System Development Corp., Santa Monica, pp. 66-67. 10. Reynolds, C. H.. "What's Wrong with Comouter Programming Management?" in On the Management of Computer Programming. Ed. G. F. Weinwurm. Philadelphia: Auerbtch. 1971, pp. 3542. 11. King, W. R., and T. A. Wilson, "Subjective Time Estimates in Critical Path Planning4 Preliminary Analyw' Management Sciences, 13 (1967). 307-320, and sequel, W. R. King, D. M. Witterrongel. and K. D. Hezel, "On the Analysis of Critical Path Time &timating Behavior," Management Sciences, 14 (1967). 79-84, 12. Brooks, F. P., and K. E. Ivenon. Automatic Data Processing, System/SSO ~dition. New York: Wiley, 1969, pp. 428-430. 0

Or. Brooks is presently a professor at the Univ. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and chairman of the computer science department there. He is best known as "the father of the IBM Systeml360,~' having served as project manager for the hardware development and as manager of the Operating Systam1360 project during its design phase. Earlier he was an architect of the IBM Stretch and Harvest computers.

At Chapel Hill he has participated in establishing and guiding the Triangle Universities Computation Center and the North Carolina Educational Computing Service. He is the author of two editions of "Automatic Data Processing" and "The Mythical Man-Month: Essays on Software Engineering" (Addison- Wesley), from which this excerpt is taken.

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Source: [Fermat's Library](https://fermatslibrary.com/) — https://fermatslibrary.com/s/the-mythical-man-month. More annotated papers: https://fermatslibrary.com/llms.txt
