
µ(λ|S) = µ(λ|S
0
) ∀λ ∈ Λ, (9)
where
µ(λ|S) ≡
X
s∈V
S
µ(s, λ|S) =
X
s∈V
S
p(s|S)µ(λ|S, s),
and similarly
µ(λ|S
0
) ≡
X
s
0
∈V
S
0
µ(s
0
, λ|S
0
) =
X
s
0
∈V
S
0
p(s
0
|S
0
)µ(λ|S
0
, s
0
).
We will only make use of this type of preparation
noncontextuality in this paper.
The assumption of measurement noncontextual-
ity applied to operationally equivalent measurement
events [m|M] ' [m
0
|M
0
] reads
ξ(m|M, λ) = ξ(m
0
|M
0
, λ) ∀λ ∈ Λ. (10)
2.4 Contextuality scenarios and probabilistic
models on them
In keeping with the definitions of Ref. [25], we intro-
duce the following notions:
• Contextuality scenario: A contextuality scenario
is a hypergraph H where the nodes of the hy-
pergraph w ∈ W (H) denote measurement out-
comes and hyperedges denote measurements f ∈
F (H) ⊆ 2
W (H)
such that
S
f∈F (H)
= W (H). We
will assume the set of nodes W (H) is finite and,
therefore, so is the set of hyperedges F (H).
A node shared between multiple hyperedges rep-
resents a measurement outcome with multiple
possible measurement contexts in which it can
occur. This is the notion of a (measurement) con-
text that is used in logical proofs of the Kochen-
Specker theorem relying on KS-uncolourability
[1, 20]. We will be concerned with this notion
of measurement context in this paper.
2
• n-hypercycle: An n-hypercycle is a collection of
n nodes, {w
i
}
n
i=1
, in a hypergraph H ≡ (W, F )
such that for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, {w
i
, w
i+1
} ⊆ f
for some f ∈ F , but no other subsets of {w
i
}
n
i=1
appear in a hyperedge of H. Note that we have
assumed addition modulo n, i.e., n+1 = 1, while
labelling the nodes.
Note that every n-hypercycle in a hypergraph is
also an n-cycle, where by “n-cycle” we refer to a
collection of n nodes, {w
i
}
n
i=1
, such that for all
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, {w
i
, w
i+1
} ⊆ f for some f ∈
F . On the other hand, not every n-cycle in a
hypergraph is an n-hypercycle.
2
Spekkens contextuality [13] encompasses the measurement
contexts relevant in the Kochen-Specker paradigm but does not
restrict itself to them (see, e.g., [7]). In particular, it allows for
a notion of preparation contexts which has been previously used
in Ref. [6] – the conceptual precursor to the present work – and
which we will use in this paper.
When the hypergraph H is a graph, i.e., every
hyperedge f ∈ F contains exactly two nodes
from W , then every n-cycle of H is also an n-
hypercycle.
3
• Probabilistic model: A probabilistic model on a
contextuality scenario is an assignment of proba-
bilities to the nodes of a hypergraph, p : W (H) →
[0, 1], such that the hyperedges are normalized,
i.e.,
P
w∈f
p(w) = 1 for all f ∈ F (H). We de-
note the set of such general probabilistic models
on H by G(H).
Viewed operationally, any probabilistic model on
the contextuality scenario specifies the probabili-
ties of measurement outcomes when the measure-
ments are implemented on some preparation in
an operational theory. A given operational the-
ory may only allow a certain subset of all possible
probabilistic models on a contextuality scenario
when the measurements in the scenario are im-
plemented on a preparation possible in the op-
erational theory. Indeed, that is the premise of
Ref. [25], where possible probabilistic models on
a given contextuality scenario are classified as
classical, quantum, or general probabilistic mod-
els. The full set of possible probabilistic models
on the contextuality scenario, corresponding to
a polytope, constitutes the set of general proba-
bilistic models.
We will be interested in the polytope of general
probabilistic models in this paper. In particu-
lar, we do not seek to classify probabilistic mod-
els on a contextuality scenario `a la Acin, Fritz,
Leverrier, and Sainz (AFLS) [25]. Instead, we
will be interested in properties of these proba-
bilistic models that become crucial only in the
operational approach `a la Spekkens [13], having
no analogue in the AFLS framework. This is to
be expected since the AFLS framework is a for-
malization of the Kochen-Specker paradigm and
we seek to ask questions that necessitate a re-
formulation and extension of this paradigm `a la
Spekkens. For the case of statistical proofs of the
Kochen-Specker theorem, this has been achieved
in Refs. [10, 14]. This paper seeks to achieve this
3
Note that we are not necessarily imagining that H it-
self is isomorphic to an n-cycle graph. H can be any ar-
bitrary hypergraph and the question is if it admits sub-
hypergraphs that are n-hypercycles. The n-hypercycles
that are contained in H are distinct from (and, in gen-
eral, fewer in number than) the n-cycles contained in
it. For example, consider the 6-vertex hypergraph H =
{{1, 2, 3}, {3, 4, 5}, {5, 6, 1}}. This hypergraph contains the fol-
lowing n-cycles: {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 3}}, {{3, 4}, {4, 5}, {3, 5}},
{{5, 6}, {6, 1}, {1, 5}}, and {{1, 3}, {3, 5}, {1, 5}}. However,
only one of these n-cycles is an n-hypercycle, namely,
{{1, 3}, {3, 5}, {1, 5}}, since its vertices are not all contained
in a single hyperedge. When the hypergraph is a graph, e.g.,
H
0
= {{1, 3}, {3, 5}, {1, 5}}, then all its n-cycles are also n-
hypercycles.
Accepted in Quantum 2019-12-31, click title to verify. Published under CC-BY 4.0. 5