# Odds Adjustments by American Horse-Race Bettors

> An annotated edition of this paper on Fermat's Library, where scientists and readers explain its ideas, equations and history in the margins. Annotated edition: https://fermatslibrary.com/s/odds-adjustments-by-american-horse-race-bettors

- **Authors:** R. M. Griffith
- **Published:** 1949
- **Topic:** Economics
- **Original:** https://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/fermatslibrary/uploads%2F1769472047624-8j7yv0pirx-88316a137582a5cd8f21d6ea6eb71dc1%2Fodds_adjustments+short.pdf
- **Pages:** 5
- **Annotations:** 11 comments in 11 threads
- **Featured:** Fermat's Library Journal Club
- **Annotated edition:** https://fermatslibrary.com/s/odds-adjustments-by-american-horse-race-bettors

## Annotations

### Annotation 1 (page 1)

Beside the passage: “In horse-race betting, the odds on the various horses in any race are a functioning of the proportion of the total money that is bet on each and hence are socially determined. On the other hand, the objective probability for winners from any group of horses is given a posteriori by the percentage of winners. Thus the …”

**Annotation** by João Batalha (2026-01-27):

> Horse-race betting typically follows a pari-mutuel system. The term comes from the French pari mutuel, meaning “mutual bet” or “bet among ourselves,” emphasizing that bettors wager against one another rather than against the house. All bets on a race are placed into a common pool, from which the track and the state remove a fixed percentage as revenue. The remaining money is then shared among those who bet on the winning horse.
>
> Because payouts come from this shared pool, the odds on each horse are determined entirely by how the total money is distributed. For example, if \$10,000 is wagered in total and \$1,000 is placed on a particular horse, that horse represents roughly one tenth of the pool and will have relatively high odds. If additional bettors move their money to that horse, its share of the pool increases and its odds fall. The odds therefore summarize the crowd’s aggregate judgment rather than an externally assigned probability, which is why they are described as socially determined.

### Annotation 2 (page 1)

Beside the passage: “In horse-race betting, the odds on the various horses in any race are a functioning of the proportion of the total money that is bet on each and hence are socially determined. On the other hand, the objective probability for winners from any group of horses is given a posteriori by the percentage of winners. Thus the …”

**Annotation** by João Batalha (2026-01-27):

> The "objective probability" is determined empirically. Since the true probability of a specific horse winning is unknowable in advance, the author approximates it a posteriori (after the fact) by grouping horses with similar betting odds and calculating the percentage that actually won.
>
> This contrasts with the betting odds, which represent the subjective or psychological probability assigned by the bettors before the race.

### Annotation 3 (page 1)

Beside the passage: “light not only on the specific topics of horse-race betting and gambling but on the more general field of the psychology of probabilities. Becknell noted with her idealogies of probability that in many situations not the probability but the judgment of the probability is the critical variable.1 Goodfellow2 and …”

**Annotation** by João Batalha (2026-01-27):

> Elizabeth Becknell's 1940 paper argued that human decisions are often driven by "ideologies" or internal concepts of chance rather than actual statistical likelihoods.
>
> Two individuals facing identical odds may act very differently based on their beliefs about chance and uncertainty.
>
> The term "ideologies of probability" refers to the mental frameworks people use to interpret uncertain events - some may believe in luck or hot streaks, others in pure mathematical randomness. These belief systems shape probability judgments in ways that deviate from objective calculation.

### Annotation 4 (page 1)

Beside the passage: “light not only on the specific topics of horse-race betting and gambling but on the more general field of the psychology of probabilities. Becknell noted with her idealogies of probability that in many situations not the probability but the judgment of the probability is the critical variable.1 Goodfellow2 and …”

**Annotation** by João Batalha (2026-01-27):

> In 1937, Zenith Radio Corporation sponsored a nationwide radio experiment to test telepathy. "Senders" in Chicago concentrated on randomly selected Zener cards (bearing symbols like circles, stars, and wavy lines), while thousands radio listeners attempted to "receive" these thoughts and mail in their guesses.
>
> Goodfellow analyzed over one million responses and found that above-chance "hits" were not evidence of ESP (Extra-Sensory Perception). Instead, people have systematic preferences when guessing randomly - 35% chose circles first, 78% chose heads over tails, and most favored "light" over "dark”. The apparent telepathy simply reflected moments when the random selection happened to match these common biases.
>
> Griffith cites this to illustrate how subjective beliefs about probability - not actual probabilities - drive behavior even in controlled experiments.

### Annotation 5 (page 1)

Beside the passage: “light not only on the specific topics of horse-race betting and gambling but on the more general field of the psychology of probabilities. Becknell noted with her idealogies of probability that in many situations not the probability but the judgment of the probability is the critical variable.1 Goodfellow2 and …”

**Annotation** by João Batalha (2026-01-27):

> Preston and Baratta (1948) ran laboratory experiments where subjects bid on uncertain gambles. They discovered a systematic pattern in how people perceive probabilities:
>
> - Small probabilities are overvalued (a 5% chance "feels" larger than 5%)
> - Large probabilities are undervalued (a 90% chance "feels" smaller than 90%)
>
> The indifference point - where subjective and objective probability match- fell near the geometric mean of the probabilities they tested (around 0.20-0.25).
> They linked this to Helson's adaptation-level theory, which proposes that humans judge stimuli not in absolute terms but relative to a neutral reference point. This reference point is determined by the range of stimuli encountered, and Helson found it typically falls at the geometric mean of that range.

### Annotation 6 (page 1)

Beside the passage: “Betting on horse-races offers per se specific but non-trivial psychological problems. Undoubtedly the most common form of gambling, it has assumed such proportions as to be a major socio-economic problem and to constitute large portions of the revenue of condoning states.' Gambling has been analyzed for knowledge of …”

**Annotation** by João Batalha (2026-01-27):

> The late 1940s marked the peak of horse racing's golden age in America. By the 1950s, horse racing was one of the most attended spectator sports—drawing nearly 20 million fans annually. Horses like Seabiscuit, Citation, and Whirlaway were national celebrities, and Triple Crown races received front-page newspaper coverage.
>
>
> This was also the only legal gambling game in town. Casinos were confined to Nevada, state lotteries didn't exist, and sports betting was illegal everywhere. Horse racing had a virtual monopoly on legal wagering, making tracks both entertainment venues and de facto casinos.

### Annotation 7 (page 2)

Beside the passage: “The pari-mutuel system employed at the race-tracks requires explanation. All the money bet on prospective winners of a race is pooled and a percentage (ranging from 7 to 15) known as the 'take' is deducted as revenue for the track and for state or local government. The holders of the winning tickets receive the …”

**Annotation** by João Batalha (2026-01-27):

> Pari-mutuel (French for "mutual betting") means bettors wager against each other, not against the house. All bets are pooled together, the track takes a fixed percentage, and the rest is distributed to winners.
> Example: Consider a race with three horses where 10,000 USD total is wagered:
>
> - Horse A: 5,000 USD bet
>
> - Horse B: 3,000 USD bet
>
> - Horse C: 2,000 USD bet
>
> The track takes 15%, leaving 8,500 USD to pay winners.
> If Horse C wins, the 8,500 USD is split among those who bet on Horse C. Each 1 dollar bet on Horse C returns $ \$8,500 ÷ \$2,000 = \$4.25$. This means odds of 3.25-to-1 (you get \$3.25 profit plus your \$1 stake back).
>
> **Key insight:** The odds aren't set by the track - they emerge from how bettors distribute their money. If more people pile onto a horse, its odds drop; if money flows elsewhere, its odds rise. The totalizator displays these constantly updating odds so bettors can see the current state of the pool.
>
> **Breakage** refers to rounding payouts down to the nearest nickel or dime. On a \$2 bet, a calculated return of \$7.37 might pay only \$7.30 - the track keeps the difference.

### Annotation 8 (page 2)

Beside the passage: “The pari-mutuel system employed at the race-tracks requires explanation. All the money bet on prospective winners of a race is pooled and a percentage (ranging from 7 to 15) known as the 'take' is deducted as revenue for the track and for state or local government. The holders of the winning tickets receive the …”

**Annotation** by João Batalha (2026-01-27):

> In standard probability theory, odds are defined as the reciprocal of probability: if an outcome has probability p, its fair odds are $\frac{1}{p}$, and the expected value of a wager is the stake multiplied by $p$ and divided by the odds. In pari-mutuel betting, however, the odds displayed at the track usually omit the return of the original stake, showing only the net profit. By redefining “odds” as track-odds plus one, the paper restores the conventional mathematical relationship between odds, probability, and expectation. With this definition, an even bet corresponds to odds of 2, matching a probability of $\frac{1}{2}$, and expected value calculations remain consistent throughout the analysis.

### Annotation 9 (page 2)

Beside the passage: “The pari-mutuel system employed at the race-tracks requires explanation. All the money bet on prospective winners of a race is pooled and a percentage (ranging from 7 to 15) known as the 'take' is deducted as revenue for the track and for state or local government. The holders of the winning tickets receive the …”

**Annotation** by João Batalha (2026-01-27):

> Before betting opened, track handicappers posted "morning line" odds—their expert predictions of each horse's chances. These served as a starting point for bettors.
>
> The totalizator (or "tote board") was a mechanical calculating machine that continuously tracked all bets placed and computed the current odds for each horse. Invented in 1913 by Australian engineer George Julius, it was originally designed as a vote-counting machine before being adapted for racetracks. The totalizator displayed updated odds roughly every 90 seconds, allowing bettors to see how the pool was shifting as post time approached.

### Annotation 10 (page 3)

Beside the passage: “as to have arisen from 1386 races, that for odds groups 11-16 and above 21 being multiplied by the ratio 1386/519. If the psychological odds equaled the a posteriori given by the reciprocal of the percentage winners, the product of the number of winners and their odds would equal the number of entries at each …”

**Annotation** by João Batalha (2026-01-27):

> **The Theoretical Minimum (7.8)**
>
> The value **7.8** serves as a mathematical baseline for completely unpredictable race - a hypothetical scenario where the crowd believes every single horse has an exactly equal chance of winning.
>
> **The Calculation**
> The author derives 7.8 by assuming the betting pool is split perfectly evenly among the average field size of 9 horses, adjusted for the track's revenue deduction ("take" - 13%):
>
> $$
> \text{Odds} = \text{Field Size} \times (1 - \text{Take})
> $$
> $$
> \text{Odds} = 9 \times (1 - 0.13) = \mathbf{7.83}
> $$
>
> **Why it Matters**
> The fact that the actual observed average (**10.5**) is significantly higher than **7.8** proves that bettors are not guessing randomly. By heavily backing favorites (low odds) and ignoring longshots (high odds), the crowd creates variance in the market, which mathematically forces the geometric mean up from its theoretical minimum.

### Annotation 11 (page 3)

Beside the passage: “as to have arisen from 1386 races, that for odds groups 11-16 and above 21 being multiplied by the ratio 1386/519. If the psychological odds equaled the a posteriori given by the reciprocal of the percentage winners, the product of the number of winners and their odds would equal the number of entries at each …”

**Annotation** by João Batalha (2026-01-27):

> Griffith's test works as follows: if bettors correctly assess probabilities, then for any odds group:
>
> $$\text{Number of winners} \times \text{Odds} = \text{Number of entries}$$
>
> Across hundreds of races, Griffith recorded each horse's odds and whether it won. He then grouped all horses by their odds. If 100 horses across different races all went off at odds of 5 (implied probability 20%), we'd expect about 20 of them to have won.
>
> **Observed results:** The product (winners × odds) fell below entries at every odds level - simply reflecting the track's take.
>
> After adjusting for take and breakage, a pattern emerged:
> - **At short odds (favorites):** winners × odds > entries → favorites won *more* often than bettors expected
> - **At long odds (longshots):** winners × odds < entries → longshots won *less* often than bettors expected
>
> The **indifference point** - where subjective and objective probabilities align - occurred at odds of 6.1 (probability ≈ 0.16).
>
> This is the favorite-longshot bias: bettors systematically underbet favorites and overbet longshots. A dollar wagered on favorites yielded better returns than a dollar wagered on longshots, even though both lost money on average due to the take.

## Full text

Extracted from the PDF. [Annotation N] marks where each annotation above sits.

#### Page 1

ODDS ADJUSTMENTS BY AMERICAN HORSE-RACE BETTORS

By R. M. GRIFFITH, University of Kentucky

In horse-race betting, the odds on the various horses in any race are a functioning of the proportion of the [Annotation 1] total money that is bet on each and hence are socially determined. On the other hand, the objective probability for winners from any group of horses is given a posteriori by the percentage of winners. Thus the odds express (reciprocally) a psychological probability while the percentage of winners [Annotation 2] at any odds group measures the true probability; any consistent discrepancy between the two may cast

light not only on the specific topics of horse-race betting and gambling but on the more general field of the psychology of probabilities. Becknell noted with her idealogies of probability that in many situations not the probability but the judgment of the [Annotation 3] probability is the critical variable.1 Goodfellow2 [Annotation 4] and Fernberger3 have experimentally shown that such ideologies may influence ESP results. More recently Preston and Baratta have demonstrated a systematized undervaluation of large probabilities and an overvaluation of small, with the indifferencepoint falling near the geometric mean of their series in an experimental situation [Annotation 5] and have discussed certain parallels in adaptation-levels.4 This study may help to determine the universality of their effect by submitting it to a complex, non-laboratory test.

Betting on horse-races offers [Annotation 6] per se specific but non-trivial psychological problems. Undoubtedly the most common form of gambling, it has assumed such proportions as to be a major socio-economic problem and to constitute large portions of the revenue of condoning states.' Gambling has been analyzed for knowledge of psychological and economic processes,6 and pathological gambling has been clinically studied.7 The emotionally rich background of fate and money makes this a promising field for observing variety in personality.

* Accepted for publication October 5, 1948. The author is indebted to Mr. J. A. Estes, editor of The Blood Horse, for source material and valuable suggestions. 1E. A. Becknell, Probability: A function of ideology, this JOURNAL, 53, 1940, 604-609.

2 L. D. Goodfellow, A psychological interpretation of the results of the Zenith radio experiments in telepathy, J. Exper. Psychol., 23, 1938, 601-632. 3S. W. Fernberger, 'Extra-sensory perceptions' or instructions?, ibid., 22, 1938, 602-607.

4M. G. Preston and P. Baratta, An experimental study of the auction-value of an uncertain outcome, this JOURNAL, 61, 1948, 183-193. 'See W. Steigleman, Horseracing, 1947, 27. In 1946 over $1,700,000,000 were bet in the pari-mutuel machines. Of this amount, nineteen states retained $80,000,000. Several times this amount is bet with illegal bookies. 6 E. M. Riddle, Aggressive behavior in a small social group, Arch. Psychol., 12, 1925 (no 78), 1-196; J. von Neuman and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 1944, 1-641. O. Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, 1945, 372 f.

290

#### Page 2

ODDS ADJUSTMENTS BY BETTORS

In any investigation of gambling, insight and direction may be gained from such clinical and descriptive works as The Gambler by Dostoevski. The briefest perusal reveals that not all forms of gambling are psychologically equivalent. Games of chance may be placed in a hierarchy of skills. The conative predictions of the fall of dice contrast with the cognitive factors involved in skillful poker-playing. Many people bet on horse-races because of an-be it as it may-uncritical, egotistical rationality as to their ability to select winners through handicapping procedures. In so far as a cognitive function is involved in any situation one may question the psychological applicability of the term 'gambling.' The most tentative list of ideologies involved in horse-race betting would, however, touch upon fundamental philosophies of probability and mathematical expectation, and few of the systems of betting neglect to give some consideration to the judgment of the odds of the selections; some employ them exclusively, as, for example, when a system permits only the favorites at odds exceeding a fixed value to be selected.

The pari-mutuel [Annotation 7] system employed at the race-tracks requires explanation. All the money bet on prospective winners of a race is pooled and a percentage (ranging from 7 to 15) known as the 'take' is deducted as revenue for the track and for state or local government. The holders of the winning tickets receive the remainder. The odds on any horse shown on the totalizator at the track are computed by subtracting the sum bet on the horse from the pool after take and dividing by the sum bet on the horse. Thus for each dollar the amount actually returned is the odds plus one, the one being the dollar bet. To preserve the relationship of the mathematical expectation as being the amount wagered divided by the odds, where the odds [Annotation 8] are the reciprocal of the probability, this value of the track-odds-plus-one will be referred to as the odds throughout this paper. When betting is begun on a race, experts' opinions of the true odds on each horse are shown and the totalizator keeps the bettors informed, at about 90-second intervals, until [Annotation 9] the race starts, as to the correct odds calculated approximately from the actual money bet. No pennies, and in some states, no nickels are returned on a two-dollar bet, the stray change going into another track or state fund. In the parlance of the race-course this is termed 'breakage' to the nickel or dime.8

In this study, the winners and number of horses at each odds were tallied for 519 races of the 1947 spring meets of Churchill Downs, Belmont and Hialeah and for selected odds-groups (one to eleven and sixteen to twenty-one) for an additional 867 races of all tracks for the first eight days of August 1947.9 All data were proportionately weighted 8 For a more complete description of the pari-mutuel system see Steigleman, op. cit., 17-27. 9Daily Racing Form Chart Book, 53, 1947, nos. 1, 3, 4, and 11.

291

#### Page 3

as to have arisen from 1386 races, that for odds groups 11-16 and above 21 being multiplied by the ratio 1386/519. If the psychological odds equaled the a posteriori given by the reciprocal of the percentage winners, the product of the number of winners and their odds would equal the number of entries at each odds-group after correction of the odds had been made for loss due to breakage and take. If the product exceeds the number of entries, the psychological odds were too large: if the product is less than the number of entries, the odds were too small. Breakage, causing a larger percentage loss at the small odds than at the large, was adjusted-for by assuming continuous odds rather than odds falling into five-cent intervals. The average take, proportionate at all the odds, was computed from the data as being 13%.10 The arithmetic mean of the geometric means of the odds posted at the track for each of a sample of 42 races was obtained as 10.5; the theoretical minimum for the geometric mean of the track odds in a single race with nine horses-the average-size field in this study-is [Annotation 10] approximately 7.8, and both values are, of course, larger if track-odds-plus-one are used. Results. The results are best shown by Fig. 1. Here it may be seen that the curve formed by the product of the number of winners times the actual odds falls below the curve for the number of entries throughout the series. When, however, the odds are corrected for breakage and take, the product consistently exceeds the number of entries at the short odds and is less than the entries at the longer odds. The point of equality by linear interpolation is 6.1, or at a probability value of 0.16. This indifference-point in track odds (to which the bettors react) is 5.1, with a reciprocal of 0.20. Thus below 0.16 or 0.20 the translated psychological probabilities are too large; above, too small. The reciprocal of the average geometric [Annotation 11] mean of the track odds of a sample of races is 0.095, and the maximum for any one nine-horse race is 0.13. Discussion. All the factors, rational and irrational, which enter into the determination of the odds on horses tend to operate in such a manner as properly to measure the horses' chances. Errors in separate events cancel in the average so that the psychological odds almost coincide with the a posteriori odds. The near congruence of the curves of Fig. 1 attests to the skill of the handicappers and patrons at handicapping the horses.

10 In any race it may be shown that the relationship exists between the odds and the take of / 1/0 0 + 1/03 ... .+ I/On = 1/(1 - y) where 0i, 02, 03, . .. On are the track-odds-plus-one for n horses corrected for breakage, and y is the fractional take. The average value for y for several races follows from summing both sides of the equation.

292 GRIFFITH

#### Page 4

ODDS ADJUSTMENTS BY BETTORS

Just as necessary and psychologically as remarkable, the money wagered at each odds is such as to preserve the relationship. The final odds are the summative result of both the skill in estimating chances, i.e. adjusting the odds, and also the proper proportion of the patrons wagering the correct amounts at each odds to preserve them. That the number of bettors preferring each odds-group and the amount they bet are in the

ooo0-

---o--- WINNERS X ODDS CORRECTED FOR LOSS TO TRACK ----- TOTAL ENTRIES --- 0----WINNERS X ODDS WINNERS

0

ODDS FIG. 1. NUMBER OF ENTRIES, WINNERS, AND WINNERS-TIMES-ODDS FOR EVERY ODDS-GROUP

correct proportion may be the result of several ideologies or to one group with the conscious system of betting on horses on which the track odds become more than the handicappers'. By the nature of the odds, a greater amount is wagered on the shortodded horses than the long-odded; though the amount is greater, it is not great enough, and too much is wagered on long-odded horses. A direct comparison with the results of Preston and Baratta is made difficult by the complexity of the situation. At the same time, whether the effect is regarded as a constant error in the judgment of odds or as a preference of odds, the effect may be considered the same as Preston and Baratta's, with even the point of indifference being approximately the same. That the principle holds in this non-laboratory situation suggests its universality.

293

#### Page 5

The fundamental difference of dealing with odds instead of probabilities is just one feature which made the outcome less predictable. That the

point of equality should be approximately equal to that of these writers

(cf. footnote p. 292) when it is translated into probability-values calls for further consideration. The nearness of this value to theirs, whereas any measure of the geometric mean is widely divergent, suggests a constancy of the point of indifference which may be relatively independent of the

geometric mean.1l

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

(1) The socially determined odds on horses in races are, on the average, correct reflections of the horses' chances.

(2) There is, however, a systematic undervaluation of the chances of short-odded horses and overvaluation of those of long-odded horses.

(3) The indifference-point occurs at odds of 6.1 or of 5.1 when track odds are used.

(4) When these values for the indifference-point are reciprocally translated into probabilities, they correspond to that found in a recent experimental work as between 0.05 and 0.25. (5) Contrary to the study cited as relating this principle to adaptationlevel theory, it is suggested that this indifference-point may not be related

simply to the geometric mean of the choices.

" Since this manuscript was submitted the statistical work was repeated upon all the races of August 1934. While our primary aim was not to corroborate the results of the original investigation, that end was also served. The results were nearly as identical as could have been expected had they arisen from the same data; the curves were practically congruent and the indifference point fell at 0.18 compared to 0.16. If the theory of adaptation-level applies to this error in judgment, the amount of money the bettors have (Preston and Baratta's "endowment background") should influence the indifference-point. It was assumed that in 1934 the bettors were in a state of impecunity relative to their lush affluency of 1947 and the study was made to determine any difference in their adjustment of odds. That the point proved invariant under these diverse economic conditions lends weight to the suggestion in the original study of an unexpected constancy of the point of indifference.

294 GRIFFITH

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