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### TL;DR In this paper M. Polanyi, arugues that life is not red...
Michael Polanyi was a Hungarian-British polymath, member of the Roy...
#### Two types of boundaries: 1. **test-tube type of boundary**:...
> ***Thus the morphology of living thing transcends the laws of phy...
Here M. Polanyi argues that the information contained in a DNA mole...
### Irreducibility: Irreducibility states that a complete account ...
**Boundary conditions form levels of hierarchy and each level is de...
The author argues that it is not possible to tell the presence of h...
> ***Evolution may be seen, then, as a progressive intensification ...
Here Polanyi gives an example in order to illustrate that the laws ...
Polanyi disagrees with the deterministic Laplacean view of universa...
#### Mind-Body problem The mind is rooted in the body but is in...
Life's
Irreducible
Structure
Live
mechanisms
and
information
in
DNA
are
boundary
conditions
with
a
sequence
of
boundaries
above
them.
Michael
Polanyi
If
all
men
were
exterminated,
this
would
not
affect
the
laws
of
inanimate
nature.
But
the
production
of
machines
would
stop,
and
not
until-
men
arose
again
could
machines
be
formed
once
more.
Some
animals
can
produce
tools,
but
only
men
can
construct
machines;
machines
are
human
artifacts,
made
of
inanimate
material.
The
Oxford
Dictionary
describes
a
machine
as
"an
apparatus
for
applying
mechanical
power,
consisting
of
a
num-
ber
of
interrelated
parts,
each
having
a
definite
function."
It
might
be,
for
example,
a
machine
for
sewing
or
print-
ing.
Let
us
assume
that
the
power
driv-
ing
the
machine
is
built
in,
and
disregard
the
fact
that
it
has
to
be
re-
newed
from
time
to
time.
We
can
say,
then,
that
the
manufacture
of
a
ma-
chine
consists
in
cutting
suitably
shaped
parts
and
fitting
them
together
so
that
their
joint
mechanical
action
should
serve
a
possible
human
purpose.
The
structure
of
machines
and
the
working
of
their
structure
are
thus
shaped
by
man,
even
while
their
ma-
terial
and
the
forces
that
operate
them
obey
the
laws
of
inanimate
nature.
In
constructing
a
machine
and
supplying
it
with
power,
we
harness
the
laws
of
nature
at
work
in
its
material
and
in
its
driving
force
and
make
them
serve
our
purpose.
This
harness
is
not
unbreakable;
the
structure
of
the
machine,
and
thus
its
working,
can
break
down.
But
this
will
not
affect
the
forces
of
inanimate
nature
on
which
the
operation
of
the
machine
relied;
it
merely
releases
them
from
the
restriction
the
machine
im-
posed
on
them
before
it
broke
down.
The
author
is
a
former
Fellow
of
Merton
Col-
lege,
Oxford,
and
Emeritus
Professor
of
social
studies
at
the
University
of
Manchester,
where
he
had
previously
held
the
Chair
of
Physical
Chemistry.
His
present
address
is
22
Upland
Park
Road,
Oxford,
England.
This
article
is
an
expanded
version
of
a
paper
presented
20
Decem-
ber
1967
at
the
New
York
meeting
of
the
AAAS.
The
first
half
of
the
article
was
anticipated
in
a
paper
published
in
the
August
1967
issue
of
Chemical
and
Engineering
News.
1308
So
the
machine
as
a
whole
works
under
the
control
of
two
distinct
prin-
ciples.
The
higher
one
is
the
principle
of
the
machine's
design,
and
this
har-
nesses
the
lower
one,
which
consists
in
the
physical-chemical
processes
on
which
the
machine
relies.
We
com-
monly
form
such
a
two-leveled
struc-
ture
in
conducting
an
experiment;
but
there
is
a
difference
between
construct-
ing
a
machine
and
rigging
up
an
ex-
periment.
The
experimenter
imposes
restrictions
on
nature
in
order
to
observe
its
behavior
under
these
restric-
tions,
while
the
constructor
of
a
ma-
chine
restricts
nature
in
order
to
harness
its
workings.
But
we
may
borrow
a
term
from
physics
and
describe
both
these
useful
restrictions
of
nature
as
the
imposing
of
boundary
conditions
on
the
laws
of
physics
and
chemistry.
Let
me
enlarge
on
this.
I
have
ex-
emplified
two
types
of
boundaries.
In
the
machine
our
principal
interest
lay
in
the
effects
of
the
boundary
condi-
tions,
while
in
an
experimental
setting
we
are
interested
in
the
natural
proc-
esses
controlled
by
the
boundaries.
There
are
many
common
examples
of
both
types
of
boundaries.
When
a
saucepan
bounds
a
soup
that
we
are
cooking,
we
are
interested
in
the
soup;
and,
likewise,
when
we
observe
a
re-
action
in
a
test
tube,
we
are
studying
the
reaction,
not
the
test
tube.
The
reverse
is
true
for
a
game
of
chess.
The
strategy
of
the
player
imposes
bound-
aries
on
the
several
moves,
which
fol-
low
the
laws
of
chess,
but
our
interest
lies
in
the
boundaries-that
is,
in
the
strategy,
not
in
the
several
moves
as
exemplifications
of
the
laws.
And
simi-
larly,
when
a
sculptor
shapes
a
stone
or
a
painter
composes
a
painting,
our
interest
lies
in
the
boundaries
imposed
on
a
material,
and
not
in
the
material
itself.
We
can
distinguish
these
two
types
of
boundaries
by
saying
that
the
first
represents
a
test-tube
type
of
boundary
whereas
the
second
is
of
the
machine
type.
By
shifting
our
attention,
we
may
sometimes
change
a
boundary
from
one
type
to
another.
All
communications
form
a
machine
type
of
boundary,
and
these
boundaries
form
a
whole
hierarchy
of
consecutive
levels
of
action.
A
vocabulary
sets
boundary
conditions
on
the
utterance
of
the
spoken
voice;
a
grammar
har-
nesses
words
to
form
sentences,
and
the
sentences
are
shaped
into
a
text
which
conveys
a
communication.
At
all
these
stages
we
are
interested
in
the
bounda-
ries
imposed
by
a
comprehensive
restric-
tive
power,
rather
than
in
the
principles
harnessed
by
them.
Living
Mechanisms
Are
Classed
with
Machines
From
machines
we
pass
to
living
beings,
by
remembering
that
animals
move
about
mechanically
and
that
they
have
internal
organs
which
perform
functions
as
parts
of
a
machine
do-
functions
which
sustain
the
life
of
the
organism,
much
as
the
proper
function-
ing
of
parts
of
a
machine
keeps
the
machine
going.
For
centuries
past,
the
workings
of
life
have
been
likened
to
the
working
of
machines
and
physiology
has
been
seeking
to
interpret
the
orga-
nism
as
a
complex
network
of
mecha-
nisms.
Organs
are,
accordingly,
defined
by
their
life-preserving
functions.
Any
coherent
part
of
the
organism
is
indeed
puzzling
to
physiology-and
also
meaningless
to
pathology-until
the
way
it
benefits
the
organism
is
dis-
covered.
And
I
may
add
that
any
de-
scription
of
such
a
system
in
terms
of
its
physical-chemical
topography
is
meaningless,
except
for
the
fact
that
the
description
covertly
may
recall
the
system's
physiological
interpretation-
much
as
the
topography
of
a
machine
is
meaningless
until
we
guess
how
the
device
works,
and
for
what
purpose.
In
this
light
the
organism
is
shown
to
be,
like
a
machine,
a
system
which
works
according
to
two
different
prin-
ciples:
its
structure
serves
as
a
boundary
condition
harnessing
the
physical-chemi-
cal
processes
by
which
its
organs
per-
form
their
functions.
Thus,
this
system
may
be
called
a
system
under
dual
control.
Morphogenesis,
the
process
by
which
the
structure
of
living
beings
de-
velops,
can
then
be
likened
to
the
shaping
of
a
machine
which
will
act
as
a
boundary
for
the
laws
of
inanimate
nature.
For
just
as
these
laws
serve
the
machine,
so
they
serve
also
the
devel-
oped
organism.
SCIENCE,
VOL.
160
on December 23, 2012www.sciencemag.orgDownloaded from
A
boundary
condition
is
always
ex-
traneous
to
the
process
which
it
delimits.
In
Galileo's
experiments
on
balls
rolling
down
a
slope,
the
angle
of
the
slope
was
not
derived
from
the
laws
of
me-
chanics,
but
was
chosen
by
Galileo.
And
as
this
choice
of
slopes
was
ex-
traneous
to
the
laws of
mechanics,
so
is
the
shape
and
manufacture
of
test
tubes
extraneous
to
the
laws
of
chem-
istry.
The
same
thing
holds
for
machine-
like
boundaries;
their
structure
cannot
be
defined
in
terms
of
the
laws
which
they
harness.
Nor
can
a
vocabulary
determine
the
content
of
a
text,
and
so
on.
Therefore,
if
the
structure
of
living
things
is
a
set
of
boundary
con-
ditions,
this
structure
is
extraneous
to
the
laws
of
physics
and
chemistry
which
the
organism
is
harnessing.
Thus
the
morphology
of
living
things
tran-
scends
the
laws
of
physics
and
chem-
istry.
DNA
Information
Generates
Mechanisms
But
the
analogy
between
machine
components
and
live
functioning
organs
is
weakened
by
the
fact
that
the
organs
are
not
shaped
artificially
as
the
parts
of
a
machine
are.
It
is
an
advantage,
therefore,
to
find
that
the
morphogenetic
process
is
explained
in
principle
by
the
transmission
of
information
stored
in
DNA,
interpreted
in
this
sense
by
Wat-
son
and
Crick.
A
DNA
molecule
is
said
to
represent
a
code-that
is,
a
linear
sequence
of
items,
the
arrangement
of
which
is
the
information
conveyed
by
the
code.
In
the
case
of
DNA,
each
item
of
the
series
consists
of
one
out
of
four
al-
ternative
organic
bases
(1).
Such
a
code
will
convey
the
maximum
amount
of
information
if
the
four
organic
bases
have
equal
probability
of
forming
any
particular
item
of
the
series.
Any
differ-
ence
in
the
binding
of
the
four
alter-
native
bases,
whether
at
the
same
point
of
the
series
or
between
two
points
of
the
series,
will
cause
the
information
conveyed
by
the
series
to
fall
below
the
ideal
maximum.
The
information
content
of
DNA
is
in
fact
known
to
be
reduced
to
some
extent
by
redun-
dancy,
but
I
accept
here
the
assumption
of
Watson
and
Crick
that
this
redun-
dancy
does
not
prevent
DNA
from
effectively
functioning
as
a
code.
I
accordingly
disregard,
for
the
sake
of
brevity,
the
redundancy
in
the
DNA
code
and
talk
of
it
as
if
it
were
func-
tioning
optimally,
with
all
of
L:s
alterna-
21
JUNE
1968
tive
basic
bindings
having
the
same
probability
of
occurrence.
Let
us
be
clear
what
would
happen
in
the
opposite
case.
Suppose
that
the
actual
structure
of
a
DNA
molecule
were
due
to
the
fact
that
the
bindings
of
its
bases
were
much
stronger
than
the
bindings
would
be
for
any
other
distribution
of
bases,
then
such
a
DNA
molecule
would
have
no
information
content.
Its
codelike
character
would
be
effaced
by
an
overwhelming
redun-
dancy.
We
may
note
that
such
is
actually
the
case
for
an
ordinary
chemical
molecule.
Since
its
orderly
structure
is
due
to
a
maximum
of
stability,
corresponding
to
a
minimum
of
potential
energy,
its
orderliness
lacks
the
capacity
to
function
as
a
code.
The
pattern
of
atoms
forming
a
crystal
is
another
instance
of
complex
order
without
appreciable
information
content.
There
is
a
kind
of
stability
which
often
opposes
the
stabilizing
force
of
a
potential
energy.
When
a
liquid
evapo-
rates,
this
can
be
understood
as
the
in-
crease
of
entropy
accompanying
the
dispersion
of
its
particles.
One
takes
this
dispersive
tendency
into
account
by
adding
its
powers
to
those
of
poten-
tial
energy,
but
the
correction
is
neg-
ligible
for
cases
of
deep
drops
in
potential
energy
or
for
low
tempera-
tures,
or
for
both.
We
can
disregard
it,
to
simplify
matters,
and
say
that
chemical
structures
established
by
the
stabilizing
powers
of
chemical
bonding
have
no
appreciable
information
con-
tent.
In
the
light
of
the
current
theory
of
evolution,
the
codelike
structure
of
DNA
must
be
assumed
to
have
come
about
by
a
sequence
of
chance
varia-
tions
established
by
natural
selection.
But
this
evolutionary
aspect
is
irrele-
vant
here;
whatever
may
be
the
origin
of
a
DNA
configuration,
it
can
function
as
a
code
only
if
its
order
is
not
due
to
the
forces
of
potential
energy.
It
must
be
as
physically
indeterminate
as
the
sequence
of
words
is
on
a
printed
page.
As
the
arrangement
of
a
printed
page
is
extraneous
to
the
chemistry
of
the
printed
page,
so
is
the
base
se-
quence
in
a
DNA
molecule
extraneous
to
the
chemical
forces
at
work
in
the
DNA
molecule.
It
is
this
physical
in-
determinacy
of
the
sequence
that
pro-
duces
the
improbability
of
occurrence
of
any
particular
sequence
and
thereby
enables
it
to
have
a
meaning-a
mean-
ing
that
has
a
mathematically
deter-
minate
information
content
equal
to
the
numerical
improbability
of
the
arrangement.
DNA
Acts
as
a
Blueprint
But
there
remains
a
fundamental
point
to
be
considered.
A
printed
page
may
be
a
mere
jumble
of
words,
and
it
has
then
no
information
content.
So
the
improbability
count
gives
the
pos-
sible,
rather
than
the
actual,
informa-
tion
content
of
a
page.
And
this
applies
also
to
the
information
content
attrib-
uted
to
a
DNA
molecule;
the
sequence
of
the
bases
is
deemed
meaningful
only
because
we
assume
with
Watson
and
Crick
that
this
arrangement
generates
the
structure
of
the
offspring
by
en-
dowing
it
with
its
own
information
content.
This
brings
us
at
last
to
the
point
that
I
aimed
at
when
I
undertook
to
analyze
the
information
content
of
DNA:
Can
the
control
of
morphogenesis
by
DNA
be
likened
to
the
designing
and
shaping
of
a
machine
by
the
engineer?
We
have
seen
that
physiology
interprets
the
or-
ganism
as
a
complex
network
of
mech-
anisms,
and
that
an
organism
is-like
a
machine-a
system
under
dual
con-
trol. Its
structure
is
that
of
a
bound-
ary
condition
harnessing
the
physical-
chemical
substances
within
the
organism
in
the
service
of
physiological
functions.
Thus,
in
generating
an
organism,
DNA
initiates
and
controls
the
growth
of
a
mechanism
that
will
work
as
a
boundary
condition
within
a
system
under
dual
control.
And
I
may
add
that
DNA
itself
is
such
a
system,
since
every
system
conveying
information
is
under
dual
control,
for
every
such
system
restricts
and
orders,
in
the
service
of
convey-
ing
its
information,
extensive
resources
of
particulars
that
would
otherwise
be
left
at
random,
and
thereby
acts
as
a
boundary
condition.
In
the
case
of
DNA
this
boundary
condition
is
a
blueprint
of
the
growing
organism
(2).
We
can
conclude
that
in
each
em-
bryonic
cell
there
is
present
the
dupli-
cate
of
a
DNA
molecule
having
a
linear
arrangement
of
its
bases-an
arrange-
ment
which,
being
independent
of
the
chemical
forces
within
the
DNA
mole-
cules,
conveys
a
rich
amount
of
mean-
ingful
information.
And
we
see
that
when
this
information
is
shaping
the
growing
embryo,
it
produces
in
it
boundary
conditions
which,
themselves
being
independent
of
the
physical
chemical
forces
in
which
they
are
rooted,
control
the
mechanism
of
life
in
the
developed
organism.
To
elucidate
this
transmission
is
a
major
task
of
biologists
today,
to
which
I
shall
return.
1309
on December 23, 2012www.sciencemag.orgDownloaded from
Some
Accessory
Problems
Arise
Here
We
have
seen
boundary
conditions
introducing
principles
not
capable
of
formulation
in
terms
of
physics
or
chemistry
into
inanimate
artifacts
and
living
things;
we
have
seen
them
as
necessary
to
an
information
content
in
a
printed
page
or
in
DNA,
and
as
in-
troducing
mechanical
principles
into
machines
as
well
as
into
the
mechanisms
of
life.
Let
me
add
now
that
boundary
con-
ditions
of
inanimate
systems
established
by
the
history
of
the
universe
are
found
in
the
domains
of
geology,
geography,
and
astronomy,
but
that
these
do
not
form
systems
of
dual
control.
They
resemble
in
this
respect
the
test-tube
type
of
boundaries
of
which
I
spoke
above.
Hence
the
existence
of
dual
con-
trol
in
machines
and
living
mechanisms
represents
a
discontinuity
between
ma-
chines
and
living
things
on
the
one
hand
and
inanimate
nature
on
the
other
hand,
so
that
both
machines
and
living
mechanisms
are
irreducible
to
the
laws
of
physics
and
chemistry.
Irreducibility
must
not
be
identified
with
the
mere
fact
that
the
joining
of
parts
may
produce
features
which
are
not
observed
in
the
separate
parts.
The
sun
is
a
sphere,
and
its
parts
are
not
spheres,
nor
does
the
law
of
gravitation
speak
of
spheres;
but
mutual
gravita-
tional
interaction
causes
the
parts
of
the
sun
to
form
a
sphere.
Such
cases
of
holism
are
common
in
physics
and
chemistry.
They
are
often
said
to
repre-
sent
a
transition
to
living
things,
but
this
is
not
the
case,
for
they
are
re-
ducible
to
the
laws
of
inanimate
matter,
while
living
things
are
not.
But
there
does
exist
a
rather
different
continuity
between
life
and
inanimate
nature.
For
the
beginnings
of
life
do
not
sharply
differ
from
their
purely
physical-chemical
antecedents.
One
can
reconcile
this
continuity
with
the
ir-
reducibility
of
living
things
by
recalling
the
analogous
case
of
inanimate
arti-
facts.
Take
the
irreducibility
of
ma-
chines;
no
animal
can
produce
a
ma-
chine,
but
some
animals
can
make
primitive
tools,
and
their
use
of
these
tools
may
be
hardly
distinguishable
from
the
mere
use
of
the
animal's
limbs.
Or
take
a
set
of
sounds
conveying
in-
formation;
the
set
of
sounds
can
be
so
obscured
by
noise
that
its
presence
is
no
longer
clearly
identifiable.
We
can
say,
then,
that
the
control
exercised
by
the
boundary
conditions
of
a
sys-
tem
can
be
reduced
gradually
to
a
vanishing
point.
The
fact
that
the
effect
1310
of
a
higher
principle
over
a
system
under
dual
control
can
have
any
value
down
to
zero
may
allow
us
also
to
conceive
of
the
continuous
emergence
of
irreducible
principles
within
the
origin
of
life.
We
Can
Now
Recognize
Additional
Irreducible
Principles
The
irreducibility
of
machines
and
printed
communications
teaches
us,
al-
so,
that
the
control
of
a
system
by
irre-
ducible
boundary
conditions
does
not
interfere
with
the
laws
of
physics
and
chemistry.
A
system
under
dual
control
relies,
in
fact,
for
the
operations
of
its
higher
principle,
on
the
working
of
principles
of
a
lower
level,
such
as
the
laws
of
physics
and
chemistry.
Irre-
ducible
higher
principles
are
additional
to
the
laws
of
physics
and
chemistry.
The
principles
of
mechanical
engineer-
ing
and
of
communication
of
informa-
tion,
and
the
equivalent
biological
prin-
ciples,
are
all
additional
to
the
laws
of
physics
and
chemistry.
But
to
assign
the
rise
of
such
addi-
tional
controlling
principles
to
a
selec-
tive
process
of
evolution
leaves
serious
difficulties.
The
production
of
boundary
conditions
in
the
growing
fetus
by
trans-
mitting
to
it
the
information
con-
tained
in
DNA
presents
a
problem.
Growth
of
a
blueprint
into
the
complex
machinery
that
it
describes
seems
to
require
a
system
of
causes
not
specifi-
able
in
terms
of
physics
and
chemistry,
such
causes
being
additional
both
to
the
boundary
conditions
of
DNA
and
to
the
morphological
structure
brought
about
by
DNA.
This
missing
principle
which
builds
a
bodily
structure
on
the
lines
of
an
instruction
given
by
DNA
may
be
ex-
emplified
by
the
far-reaching
regenera-
tive
powers
of
the
embryonic
sea
urchin,
discovered
by
Driesch,
and
by
Paul
Weiss's
discovery
that
completely
dis-
persed
embryonic
cells
will
grow,
when
lumped
together,
into
a
fragment
of
the
organ
from
which
they
were
iso-
lated
(3).
We
see
an
integrative
power
at
work
here,
characterized
by
Spemana
and
by
Paul
Weiss
as
a
"field"
(4),
which
guides
the
growth
of
embryonic
fragments
to
form
the
morphological
features
to
which
they
embryologically
belong.
These
guides
of
morphogenesis
are
given
a
formal
expression
in
Wad-
dington's
"epigenetic
landscapes"
(5).
They
say
graphically
that
the
growth
of
the
embryo
is
controlled
by
the
gra-
dient
of
potential
shapes,
much
as
the
motion
of
a
heavy
body
is
controlled
by
the
gradient
of
potential
energy.
Remember
how
Driesch
and
his
sup-
porters
fought
for
recognition
that
life
transcends
physics
and
chemistry,
by
arguing
that
the
powers
of
regeneration
in
the
sea
urchin
embryo
were
not
ex-
plicable
by
a
machinelike
structure,
and
how
the
controversy
has
continued,
along
similar
lines,
between
those
who
insisted
that
regulative
("equipotential"
or
"organismic")
integration
was
irre-
ducible
to
any
machinelike
mechanism
and
was
therefore
irreducible
also
to
the
laws
of
inanimate
nature.
Now
if,
as
I
claim,
machines
and
mechanical
proc-
esses
in
living
beings
are
themselves
irreducible
to
physics
and
chemistry,
the
situation
is
changed.
If
mechanistic
and
organismic
explanations
are
both
equally
irreducible
to
physics
and
chemistry,
the
recognition
of
organismic
processes
no
longer
bears
the
burden
of
standing
alone
as
evidence
for
the
irreducibility
of
living
things.
Once
the
"field"-like
powers
guiding
regeneration
and
mor-
phogenesis
can
be
recognized
without
involving
this
major
issue,
I
think
the
evidence
for
them
will
be
found
to
be
convincing.
There
is
evidence
of
irreducible
prin-
ciples,
additional
to
those
of
morpho-
logical
mechanisms,
in
the
sentience
that
we
ourselves
experience
and
that
we
ob-
serve
indirectly
in
higher
animals.
Most
biologists
set
aside
these
matters
as
un-
profitable
considerations.
But
again,
once
it
is
recognized,
on
other
grounds,
that
life
transcends
physics
and
chem-
istry,
there
is
no
reason
for
suspending
recognition
of
the
obvious
fact
that
consciousness
is
a
principle
that
funda-
mentally
transcends
not
only
physics
and
chemistry
but
also
the
mechanistic
principles
of
living
beings.
Biological
Hierarchies
Consist
of
a
Series
of
Boundary
Conditions
The
theory
of
boundary
conditions
recognizes
the
higher
levels
of
life
as
forming
a
hierarchy,
each
level
of
which
relies
for
its
workings
on
the
principles
of
the
levels
below
it,
even
while
it
itself
is
irreducible
to
these
lower
prin-
ciples.
I
shall
illustrate
the
structure
of
such
a
hierarchy
by
showing
the
way
five
levels
make
up
a
spoken
literary
composition.
The
lowest
level
is
the
production
of
a
voice;
the
second,
the
utterance
of
words;
the
third,
the
joining
of
words
to
make
sentences;
the
fourth,
the
work-
ing
of
sentences
into
a
style;
the
fifth,
SCIENCE,
VOL.
160
on December 23, 2012www.sciencemag.orgDownloaded from
and
highest,
the
composition
of
the
text.
The
principles
of
each
level
operate
under
the
control
of
the
next-higher
level.
The
voice
you
produce
is
shaped
into
words
by
a
vocabulary;
a
given
vocabulary
is
shaped
into
sentences
in
accordance
with
a
grammar;
and
the
sentences
are
fitted
into
a
style,
which
in
turn
is
made
to
convey
the
ideas
of
the
composition.
Thus
each
level
is
subject
to
dual
control:
(i)
control
in
accordance
with
the
laws
that
apply
to
its
elements
in
themselves,
and
(ii)
control
in
accordance
with
the
laws
of
the
powers
that
control
the
com-
prehensive
entity
formed
by
these
ele-
ments.
Such
multiple
control
is
made
pos-
sible
by
the
fact
that
the
principles
governing
the
isolated
particulars
of
a
lower
level
leave
indeterminate
condi-
tions
to
be
controlled
by
a
higher
princi-
ple.
Voice
production
leaves
largely
open
the
combination
of
sounds
into
words,
which
is
controlled
by
a
vocabulary.
Next,
a
vocabulary
leaves
largely
open
the
combination
of
words
to
form
sen-
tences,
which
is
controlled
by
grammar,
and
so
on.
Consequently,
the
operations
of
a
higher
level
cannot
be
accounted
for
by
the
laws
governing
its
particulars
on
the
next-lower
level.
You
cannot
de-
rive
a
vocabulary
from
phonetics;
you
cannot
derive
grammar
from
a
vocabu-
lary;
a
correct
use
of
grammar
does
not
account
for
good
style;
and
a
good
style
does
not
supply
the
content
of
a
piece
of
prose.
Living
beings
comprise
a
whole
se-
quence
of
levels
forming
such
a
hier-
archy.
Processes
at
the
lowest
level
are
caused
by
the
forces
of
inanimate
na-
ture,
and
the
higher
levels
control,
throughout,
the
boundary
conditions
left
open
by
the
laws
of
inanimate
na-
ture.
The
lowest
functions
of
life
are
those
called
vegetative.
These
vegetative
functions,
sustaining
life
at
its
lowest
level,
leave
open-both
in
plants
and
in
animals-the
higher
functions
of
growth
and
in
animals
also
leave
open
the
operations
of
muscular
actions.
Next,
in
turn,
the
principles
governing
mus-
cular
actions
in
animals
leave
open
the
integration
of
such
actions
to
innate
patterns
of
behavior;
and,
again,
such
patterns
are
open
in
their
turn
to
be
shaped
by
intelligence,
while
intelli-
gence
itself
can
be
made
to
serve
in
man
the
still
higher
principles
of
a
respon-
sible
choice.
Each
level
relies
for
its
operations
on
all
the
levels
below
it.
Each
reduces
the
scope
of
the
one
immediately
below
it
by
imposing
on
it
a
boundary
that
21
JUNE
1968
harnesses
it
to
the
service
of
the
next-
higher
level,
and
this
control
is
trans-
mitted
stage
by
stage,
down
to
the
basic
inanimate
level.
The
principles
additional
to
the
do-
main
of
inanimate
nature
are
the
prod-
uct
of
an
evolution
the
most
primitive
stages
of
which
show
only
vegetative
functions.
This
evolutionary
progression
is
usually
described
as
an
increasing
complexity
and
increasing
capacity
for
keeping
the
state
of
the
body
in-
dependent
of
its
surroundings.
But
if
we
accept,
as
I
do,
the
view
that
living
beings
form
a
hierarchy
in
which
each
higher
level
represents
a
distinctive
prin-
ciple
that
harnesses
the
level
below
it
(while
being
itself
irreducible
to
its
lower
principles),
then
the
evolutionary
se-
quence
gains
a
new
and
deeper
signifi-
cance.
We
can
recognize
then
a
strictly
defined
progression,
rising
from
the
in-
animate
level
to
ever
higher
additional
principles
of
life.
This
is
not
to
say
that
the
higher
levels
of
life
are
altogether
absent
in
earlier
stages
of
evolution.
They
may
be
present
in
traces
long
before
they
become
prominent.
Evolution
may
be
seen,
then,
as
a
progressive
intensifica-
tion
of
the
higher
principles
of
life.
This
is
what
we
witness
in
the
develop-
ment
of
the
embryo
and
of
the
growing
child-processes
akin
to
evolution.
But
this
hierarchy
of
principles
raises
once
more
a
serious
difficulty.
It
seems
impossible
to
imagine
that
the
sequence
of
higher
principles,
transcending
fur-
ther
at
each
stage
the
laws
of
inanimate
nature,
is
incipiently
present
in
DNA
and
ready
to
be
transmitted
by
it
to
the
offspring.
The
conception
of
a
blue-
print
fails
to
account
for
the
transmis-
sion
of
faculties,
like
consciousness,
which
no
mechanical
device
can
possess.
It
is
as
if
the
faculty
of
vision
were
to
be
made
intelligible
to
a
person
born
blind
by
a
chapter
of
sense
physiology.
It
appears,
then,
that
DNA
evokes
the
ontogenesis
of
higher
levels,
rather
than
determining
these
levels.
And
it
would
follow
that
the
emergence
of
the
kind
of
hierarchy
I
have
defined
here
can
be
only
evoked,
and
not
determined,
by
atomic
or
molecular
accidents.
How-
ever,
this
question
cannot
be
argued
here.
Understanding
a
Hierarchy
Needs
"from-at"
Conceptions
I
said
above
that
the
transcendence
of
atomism
by
mechanism
is
reflected
in
the
fact
that
the
presence
of
a
mech-
anism
is
not
revealed
by
its
physical-
chemical
topography.
We
can
say
the
same
thing
of
all
higher
levels:
their
description
in
terms
of
any
lower
level
does
not
tell
us
of
their
presence.
We
can
generally
descend
to
the
compo-
nents
of
a
lower
level
by
analyzing
a
higher
level,
but
the
opposite
proc-
ess
involves
an
integration
of
the
principles
of
the
lower
level,
and
this
integration
may
be
beyond
our
pow-
ers.
In
practice
this
difficulty
may
be
avoided.
To
take
a
common
example,
suppose
that
we
have
repeated
a
particu-
lar
word,
closely
attending
to
the
sound
we
are
making,
until
these
sounds
have
lost
their
meaning
for
us;
we
can
re-
cover
this
meaning
promptly
by
evok-
ing
the
context
in
which
the
word
is
commonly
used.
Consecutive
acts
of
analyzing
and
integrating
are
in
fact
generally
used
for
deepening
our
un-
derstanding
of
complex
entities
com-
prising
two
or
more
levels.
Yet
the
strictly
logical
difference
be-
tween
two
consecutive
levels
remains.
You
can
look
at
a
text
in
a
language
you
do
not
understand
and
see
the
let-
ters
that
form
it
without
being
aware
of
their
meaning,
but
you
cannot
read
a
text
without
seeing
the
letters
that
convey
its
meaning.
This
shows
us
two
different
and
mutually
exclusive
ways
of
being
aware
of
the
text.
WVhen
we
look
at
words
without
understanding
them
we
are
focusing
our
attention
on
them,
whereas,
when
we
read
the
words,
our
attention
is
directed
to
their
mean-
ing
as
part
of
a
language.
We
are
aware
then
of
the
words
only
subsidiarily,
as
we
attend
to
their
meaning.
So
in
the
first
case
we
are
looking
at
the
words,
while
in
the
second
we
are
looking
from
them
at
their
meaning:
the
reader
of
a
text
has
a
from-at
knowledge
of
the
words'
meaning,
while
he
has
only
a
from
awareness
of
the
words
he
is
read-
ing.
Should
he
be
able
to
shift
his
at-
tention
fully
toward
the
words,
these
would
lose
their
linguistic
meaning
for
him.
Thus
a
boundary
condition
which
harnesses
the
principles
of
a
lower
level
in
the
service
of
a
new,
higher
level
establishes
a
semantic
relation
between
the
two
levels.
The
higher
comprehends
the
workings
of
the
lower
and
thus
forms
the
meaning
of
the
lower.
And
as
we
ascend
a
hierarchy
of
boundaries,
we
reach
to
ever
higher
levels
of
mean-
ing.
Our
understanding
of
the
whole
hierarchic
edifice
keeps
deepening
as
we
move
upward
from
stage
to
stage.
1311
on December 23, 2012www.sciencemag.orgDownloaded from
The
Sequence
of
Boundaries
Bears
on
Our
Scientific
Outlook
The
recognition
of
a
whole
sequence
of
irreducible
principles
transforms
the
logical
steps
for
understanding
the
uni-
verse
of
living
beings.
The
idea,
which
comes
to
us
from
Galileo
and
Gassendi,
that
all
manner
of
things
must
ulti-
mately
be
understood
in
terms
of
mat-
ter
in
motion
is
refuted.
The
spectacle
of
physical
matter
forming
the
basic
tangible
ground
of
the
universe
is
found
to
be
almost
empty
of
meaning.
The
universal
topography
of
atomic
particles
(with
their
velocities
and
forces)
which,
according
to
Laplace,
offers
us
a
uni-
versal
knowledge
of
all
things
is
seen
to
contain
hardly
any
knowledge
that
is
of
interest.
The
claims
made,
follow-
ing
the
discovery
of
DNA,
to
the
effect
that
all
study
of
life
could
be
reduced
eventually
to
molecular
biology,
have-
shown
once
more
that
the
Laplacean
idea
of
universal
knowledge
is
still
the
theoretical
ideal
of
the
natural
sciences;
current
opposition
to these
declarations
has
often
seemed
to
confirm
this
ideal,
by
defending
the
study
of
the
whole
organism
as
being
only
a
temporary
approach.
But
now
the
analysis
of
the
hierarchy
of
living
things
shows
that
to
reduce
this
hierarchy
to
ultimate
par-
ticulars
is
to
wipe
out
our
very
sight
of
it.
Such
analysis
proves
this
ideal
to
be
both
false
and
destructive.
Each
separate
level
of
existence
is
of
course
interesting
in
itself
and
can
be
studied
in
itself.
Phenomenology
has
taught
this,
by
showing
how
to
save
higher,
less
tangible
levels
of
experience
by
not
trying
to
interpret
them
in
terms
of
the
more
tangible
things
in
which
their
existence
is
rooted.
This
method
was
intended
to
prevent
the
reduction
of
man's
mental
existence
to
mechanical
structures.
The
results
of
the
method
were
abundant
and
are
still
flowing,
but
phenomenology
left
the
ideal
of
exact
science
untouched
and
thus
failed
to
secure
the
exclusion
of
its
claims.
Thus,
phenomenological
studies
re-
mained
suspended
over
an
abyss
of
reductionism.
Moreover,
the
relation
of
the
higher
principles
to
the
workings
of
the
lowest
levels
in
which
they
are
rooted
was
lost
from
sight
altogether.
I
have
mentioned
how
a
hierarchy
controlled
by
a
series
of
boundary
prin-
ciples
should
be
studied.
When
examin-
ing
any
higher
level,
we
must
remain
subsidiarily
aware
of
its
grounds
in
lower
levels
and,
turning
our
attention
to
the
latter,
we
must
continue
to
see
them
as
bearing
on
the
levels
above
-thm.
Such
alternation
of
detailing
and
1312
integrating
admittedly
leaves
open
many
dangers.
Detailing
may
lead
to
pedantic
excesses,
while
too-broad
in-
tegrations
may
present
us
with
a
mean-
dering
impressionism.
But
the
principle
of
stratified
relations
does
offer
at
least
a
rational
framework
for
an
in-
quiry
into
living
things
and
the
prod-
ucts
of
human
thought.
I
have
said
that
the
analytic
descent
from
higher
levels
to
their
subsidiaries
is
usually
feasible
to
some
degree,
while
the
integration
of
items
of
a
lower
level
so
as
to
predict
their
possible
meaning
in
a
higher
context
may
be
beyond
the
range
of
our
integrative
powers.
I
may
add
now
that
the
same
things
may
be
seen
to
have
a
joint
meaning
when
viewed
from
one
point,
but
to
lack
this
connection
when
seen
from
another
point.
From
an
airplane
we
can
see
the
traces
of
prehistoric
sites
which,
over
the
centuries,
have
been
unnoticed
by
people
walking
over
them;
indeed,
once
he
has
landed,
the
pilot
himself
may
no
longer
see
these
traces.
The
relation
of
mind
to
body
has
a
similar
structure.
The
mind-body
prob-
lem
arises
from
the
disparity
between
the
experience
of
a
person
observing
an
external
object-for
example,
a
cat-
and
a
neurophysiologist
observing
the
bodily
mechanism
by
means
of
which
the
person
sees
the
cat.
The
difference
arises
from
the
fact
that
the
person
observing
the
cat
has
a
from-knowledge
of
the
bodily
responses
evoked
by
the
light
in
his
sensory
organs,
and
this
from-knowledge
integrates
the
joint
meaning
of
these
responses
to
form
the
sight
of
the
cat,
whereas
the
neurophys-
iologist,
looking
at
these
responses
from
outside,
has
only
an
at-knowledge
of
them,
which,
as
such,
is
not
integrated
to
form
the
sight
of
the
cat.
This
is
the
same
duality
that
exists
between
the
airman
and
the
pedestrian
in
interpret-
ing
the
same
traces,
and
the
same
that
exists
between
a
person
who,
when
reading
a
written
sentence,
sees
its
meaning
and
another
person
who,
being
ignorant
of
the
language,
sees
only
the
writing.
Awareness
of
mind
and
body
con-
front
us,
therefore,
with
two
different
things.
The
mind
harnesses
neurophys-
iological
mechanisms
and
is
not
de-
termined
by
them.
Owing
to
the
exist-
ence
of
two
kinds
of
awareness-the
focal
and
the
subsidiary-we
can
now
distinguish
sharply
between
the
mind
as
a
"from-at'
experience
and
the
sub-
sidiaries
of
this
experience,
seen
focally
as
a
bodily
mechanism.
We
can
see
then
that,
though
rooted
in
the
body,
the
mind
is
free
in
its
actions-exactly
as
our
common
sense
knows
it
to
be
free.
The
mind
itself
includes
an
ascending
sequence
of
principles.
Its
appetitive
and
intellectual
workings
are
tran-
scended
by
principles
of
responsibility.
Thus
the
growth
of
man
to
his
highest
levels
is
seen
to
take
place
along
a
se-
quence
of
rising
principles.
And
we
see
this
evolutionary
hierarchy
built
as
a
sequence
of
boundaries,
each
opening
the
way
to
higher
achievements
by
har-
nessing
the
strata
below
them,
to
which
they
themselves
are
not
reducible.
These
boundaries
control
a
rising
series
of
relations
which
we
can
understand
only
by
being
aware
of
their
constituent
parts
subsidiarily,
as
bearing
on
the
upper
level
which
they
serve.
The
recognition
of
certain
basic
im-
possibilities
has
laid
the
foundations
of
some
major
principles
of
physics
and
chemistry;
similarly,
recognition
of
the
impossibility
of
understanding
living
things
in
terms
of
physics
and
chemistry,
far
from
setting
limits
to
our
under-
standing
of
life,
will
guide
it
in
the
right
direction.
And
even
if
the
demonstra-
tion
of
this
impossibility
should
prove
of
no
great
advantage
in
the
pursuit
of
discovery,
such
a
demonstration
would
help
to
draw
a
truer
image
of
life
and
man
than
that
given
us
by
the
present
basic
concepts
of
biology.
Summary
Mechanisms,
whether
man-made
or
morphological,
are
boundary
conditions
harnessing
the
laws
of
inanimate
nature,
being
themselves
irreducible
to
those
laws.
The
pattern
of
organic
bases
in
DNA
which
functions
as
a
genetic
code
is
a
boundary
condition
irreducible
to
physics
and
chemistry.
Further
control-
ling
principles
of
life
may
be
represented
as
a
hierarchy
of
boundary
conditions
extending,
in
the
case
of
man,
to
con-
sciousness
and
responsibility.
References
and
Notes
1.
More
precisely,
each
item
consists
of
one
out
of
four
alternatives
consisting
in
two
positions
of
two
different
compound
organic
bases.
2.
The
blueprint
carried
by
the
DNA
molecule
of
a
particular
zygote
also
prescribes
individ-
ual
features
of
this
organism,
wbich
contribute
to
the
sources
of
selective
evolution,
but
I
shall
set
these
features
aside
hbre.
3.
See
P.
Weiss,
Proc.
Nat.
Acad.
Sc.
U.S.
42,
819
(1956).
4.
The
"field"
concept
was
first
used
by
Spemann
(1921)
in
describing
the
organizer;
Paul
Weiss
(1923)
introduced
it
for
the
study
of
regener-
ation
and
extended
it
(1926)
to
include
ontogeny.
See
P.
Weiss,
Principles
of
Develop-
ment
(Holt,
New
York,
1939),
p.
290.
5.
See,
for
example,
C.
H.
Waddington,
The
Strategy
of
the
Genes
(Allen
&
Unwin,
London,
1957),
particularly
the
graphic
explanation
of
"genetic
assimilation"
on
page
167.
6.
See,
for
example,
M.
Polanyi,
Amer.
Psychol-
ogist
23
(Jan.
1968)
or
--,
The
Tacit
Dimension
(Doubleday,
New
York,
1967).
SCIENCE,
VOL.
160
on December 23, 2012www.sciencemag.orgDownloaded from

Discussion

> ***Thus the morphology of living thing transcends the laws of physics and chemistry.*** Polanyi argues that the form and function of a biological system (for example a flower) cannot be explained by the laws governing its constituents. The author argues that it is not possible to tell the presence of higher levels just with their description in terms of any of their lower level constituents. It is possible to discover the components of a lower level by analyzing a higher level, but the opposite is not true. #### Two types of boundaries: 1. **test-tube type of boundary**: We are interested in what is inside the boundary, i.e. what is happening inside the test tube. 2. **machine type of boundary**: We are interested in the boundary itself, i.e. constraints of the game of chess, boundary imposed by a sculptor on a piece of rock. We may change from one type of boundary to the another by shifting our attention. **Boundary conditions form levels of hierarchy and each level is dependent on the principles below it.** Polanyi gives the example of literary composition that can be seen as a composition of five levels: - first level: is the production of a voice - second level: the utterance of words - third level: the joining of words to make sentences - fourth level: the working of sentences into a style - fifth level: the composition of the text Here M. Polanyi argues that the information contained in a DNA molecule is not reducible to the laws of physics and chemistry. He states that DNA cannot exist without physical properties of inanimate objects but these properties are constrained by higher level of emerging principles. ### Irreducibility: Irreducibility states that a complete account and explanation of a system is not possible at lower levels. A complex system has novel and emergent properties that are beyond prediction and explanation. M. Polanyi is an advocate of emergence. Emergence occurs in a system of individual simpler parts only when you put the different parts together. The new, larger system exhibits new properties that cannot be explained by the simpler individual system. Learn more here: - [Irreducibility](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irreducibility) - [Emergence - P. W. Anderson - More is Different](http://fermatslibrary.com/s/more-is-different) Here Polanyi gives an example in order to illustrate that the laws governing a lower level do not account for the operations of a higher level. > ***You cannot derive a vocabulary from phonetics; you cannot derive grammar from a vocabulary; a correct use of grammar does not account for good style; and a good style does not supply the content of a piece of prose.*** > ***Evolution may be seen, then, as a progressive intensification of the higher principles of life. This is what we witness in the development of the embryo and of the growing child - processes akin to evolution.*** #### Mind-Body problem The mind is rooted in the body but is in itself a ascending sequence of principles. It harnesses neurophysiological mechanisms but is not determined by them. Its intellectual workings are transcended by higher principles like a sense of responsibility. The growth of man to his highest levels seems to take place along a sequence of rising principles. Polanyi disagrees with the deterministic Laplacean view of universal knowledge. He does not believe that the study of life can be simply reduced to molecular biology. He argues that the analytic descent from higher levels to their lower levels is feasible, but the integration of items of a lower level so as to predict their possible meaning in a higher context may be beyond the range of our integrative powers. Learn more about the Laplacean view here: [Laplace's demon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laplace%27s_demon) Michael Polanyi was a Hungarian-British polymath, member of the Royal Society, who made important theoretical contributions to Physical Chemistry, Economics, and Philosophy. Two of his pupils and his son won Nobel Prizes in Chemistry. Polanyi was an **advocate of emergence and a critic of reductionism.** He believed that reductions was relatively harmless in the formal sciences, but generated nihilism in the humanities. Learn more here: [Michael Polanyi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Polanyi) ![mp](https://i.imgur.com/eQWFTaj.jpg) ### TL;DR In this paper M. Polanyi, arugues that life is not reducible to physics and chemistry. He belieces that emergent boundary conditions exist that provide new degrees of freedom that are determined by higher level realities. He argues: - Irreducibility: He believes that a complete account and explanation of a system is not possible at lower levels. A complex system has novel and emergent properties that are beyond prediction and explanation. - Non-reductionist: He has a non-reductionist point of view and states that the "transmission of information is nonchemical and nonphysical", therefore the "description of a living system transcends the chemical and physical laws which govern its atomic constituents." - Emergence: The emergence phenomenon occurs in a system of individual simpler parts only when you put the different parts together. The new, larger system exhibits new properties that cannot be explained by the simpler individual system. ***"Information in the DNA could no more be reduced to the chemical than could the ideas in a book be reduced to the ink and paper: something beyond physics and chemistry is encoded in DNA."***
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