# Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?

> An annotated edition of this paper on Fermat's Library, where scientists and readers explain its ideas, equations and history in the margins. Annotated edition: https://fermatslibrary.com/s/is-justified-true-belief-knowledge

- **Authors:** Edmund L. Gettier
- **Published:** 1963
- **Topic:** Economics
- **Original:** https://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/fermatslibrary/uploads%2F1666543649433-cxlbfjlf0s-8b5730854f3335cedf95005bc910b1e4%2FGettier.pdf
- **Pages:** 3
- **Annotations:** 5 comments in 5 threads
- **Featured:** Fermat's Library Journal Club
- **Annotated edition:** https://fermatslibrary.com/s/is-justified-true-belief-knowledge

## Annotations

### Annotation 1 (page 1)

Beside the passage: “IS JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF KNOWLEDGE?”

**Annotation** by Micael Oliveira (2022-10-23):

> ### TL;DR
>
> **What is knowledge?**
>
> The question of "what constitutes knowledge?" is as old as philosophy itself. Since Plato the universally accepted theory was that justified, true belief is necessary and sufficient for knowledge - **Justified True Belief (JTB).** The JTB framework for knowledge can be described as follows:
>
> A subject S knows that a proposition P is true if and only if:
> - P is true, and
> - S believes that P is true, and
> - S is justified in believing that P is true
>
> In this short and insightful paper E. Gettier sets out to challenge the dominant theory of knowledge by providing 2 simple cases famously known as the "Gettier Problems".
>
> Gettier problems are possible situations in which someone has a belief that is both true and well supported by evidence, yet fails to be knowledge.
>
> This paper had a dramatic impact, as epistemologists began questioning what knowledge is, with almost all agreeing that Gettier had refuted the traditional definition of knowledge.
>
>
> Further reading:
> - [The Analysis of Knowledge](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#KnowJustTrueBeli)
> - [Gettier Problems](https://iep.utm.edu/gettier/)

### Annotation 2 (page 1)

Beside the passage: “V ARIOUS attempts have been made in recent years to state necessary and sufficient conditions for someone's knowing a given proposition. The attempts have often been such that they can be stated in a form similar to the following: 1”

**Annotation** by Micael Oliveira (2022-10-25):

> Edmund L. Gettier III was an American philosopher and Professor Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. Gettier obtained his B.A. from Johns Hopkins University in 1949 and earned his PhD in philosophy from Cornell University in 1961 with a dissertation on “Bertrand Russell’s Theories of Belief”.
>
> He is best known for this paper, which remains one of the most famous in recent philosophical history.
>
> Learn more here: [Edmund Gettier](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edmund_Gettier)
>
> !["Gettier"](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/ad/Edmund_L_Gettier_III_ca_1960s_umass.jpg/1280px-Edmund_L_Gettier_III_ca_1960s_umass.jpg)

### Annotation 3 (page 1)

Beside the passage: “I shall argue that (a) is false in that the conditions stated therein do not constitute a stlfficient condition for the truth of the proposition that S knows that P. The same argument will show that (b) and (c) fail if , has adequate evidence for' or ' has the right to be sure that' is substituted for' is justified in …”

**Annotation** by Micael Oliveira (2022-10-25):

> Here is one kind of example:
>
> > "Imagine that we are seeking water on a hot day. We suddenly see water, or so we think. In fact, we are not seeing water but a mirage, but when we reach the spot, we are lucky and find water right there under a rock. Can we say that we had genuine knowledge of water? The answer seems to be negative, for we were just lucky. (quoted from Dreyfus 1997: 292)"
>
> Source: [The Analysis of Knowledge - 3. The Gettier Problem](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#GettProb)

### Annotation 4 (page 2)

Beside the passage: “Case I: Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition:”

**Annotation** by Micael Oliveira (2022-10-25):

> Another example of a Gettier Problem:
>
> Pluto was a planet
>
> For years we believed that there were 9 planets in the solar system and that Pluto was the 9th planet. Nowadays we no longer consider Pluto a planet but we know of the Planet Nine - hypothetical planet in the outer region of the Solar System.
>
> Using the JTB framework we have that:
>
> - We believed that there were 9 planets
> - It was true
> - We were justified in believing it because of observations
>
> We were in a sense wrong because we believed that Pluto was planet number 9 and it turns out it wasn't.

### Annotation 5 (page 2)

Beside the passage: “Case I: Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition :”

**Annotation** by Micael Oliveira (2022-10-23):

> Here is a brief video explanation of Gettier's first counter example:
>
> [![](https://i.imgur.com/LeO9Srq.png)](https://youtu.be/5wCVhhzmSlU?t=160)

## Full text

Extracted from the PDF. [Annotation N] marks where each annotation above sits.

#### Page 1

ANALYSIS 23.6 JUNE 1963

IS JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF KNOWLEDGE? [Annotation 1]

v

ARIOUS attempts have been made in recent years to state necessary and sufficient conditions for someone's knowing a given proposition. The attempts have often been such that they can be stated in a form similar to the fo1lowing:l

(a) S knows that P IFF (i) P is true, (ii) S believes that l', and (iii) S is justified in believing that P.

For example, Chisholm has held that the following gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge :2

(b) S knows that P IFF (i) S accepts P, (ii) S has adequate evidence for P,

and (iii) P is true.

Ayer has stated the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge as follows :3

(c) S knows that P IFF (i) P is true, (ii) S is sure that P is true, and (iii) S has the right to be sure that P is true.

I shall argue that (a) is false in that the conditions stated therein do not constitute a sttficietzt condition for the truth of the proposition that S knows that P. The same argument will show that (b) and (c) fail if ' has adequate evidence for ' or ' has the right to be sure that ' is substituted for ' is justified in believing that ' throughout. I shall begin by noting two points. First, in that sense of ' justified ' in which S's being justified in believing P is a necessary condition of S's knowing that P, it is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact false. Secondly, for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q. Keeping these two points in mind, I shall now present two cases Plato seems to be considering some such definition at Th~aefetz~. 201, and perhaps accepting one at Meno 98. 2 Roderick M. Chisholm, P?rceivin,o: a l'hilosop~~ical Sfdy, Cornell University Press (Ithaca, New York, 1957), p. 16. A. J. Ayer, The Pr~blem of Knowledge, Macmillan (London, 1956), p. 34. 121

ANALYSIS 23.6 JUNE 1963

IS JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF KNOWLEDGE?

By EDMUND L. GETTIER

V ARIOUS attempts have been made in recent years to state necessary and sufficient conditions for someone's knowing a given proposition. The attempts have often been such that they can be stated in a form [Annotation 2] similar to the following: 1

(a) S knows that P IFF (i) P is true, (ii) S believes that P, and (iii) S is justified in believing that P.

For example, Chisholm has held that the following gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge: 2

(b) S knows that P IFF (i) S accepts P, (ii) S has adequate evidence for P,

and (iii) P is true.

Ayer has stated the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge as follows: 3

(c) S knows that P iFF (i) P is true, (ii) S is sure that P is true, and (iii) S has the right to be sure that P

is true.

I shall argue that (a) is false in that the conditions stated therein do not constitute a stlfficient condition for the truth of the proposition that S knows that P. The same argument will show that (b) and (c) fail if , has adequate evidence for' or ' has the right to be sure that' is substituted for' is justified in believing that' throughout. I shall begin by noting two points. First, in that sense of' justified' in which S's being justified in believing P is a necessary condition of S's knowing that P, it [Annotation 3] is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact false. Secondly, for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q. Keeping these two points in mind, I shall now present two cases

1 Plato seems to be considering some such definition at Tbeaetetus 201, and perhaps accepting one at Meno 98. 2 Roderick M. Chi5holm, PBrceiving: a Philosopbical Study, Cornell University Press (Ithaca, New York, 1957), p. 16. 3 A. J. Ayer, Tbo Prob/em of Knowledge, Macmillan (London, 1956), p. 34.

121

#### Page 2

in which the conditions stated in (a) are true for some proposition, though it is at the same time false that the person in question knows that proposition.

Case I: Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And [Annotation 5] suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition :

(d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones's pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails :

(e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true.

But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. In our example, then, all of the following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith's pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job.

Case 11: Let us suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following proposition :

(f) Jones owns a Ford.

Smith's evidence might be that Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford. Let us imagine, now, that Smith has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally ignorant. Smith selects three place-names quite at random, and constructs the following three propositions :

(g) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston;

122 ANALYSIS

in which the conditions stated in (a) are true for some proposition, though it is at the same time false that the person in question knows that proposition.

Case [Annotation 4] I: Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition:

(d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones's pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails:

(e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true. But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. In our example, then, all of the following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith's pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job.

Case II: Let us suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following proposition:

(f) Jones owns a Ford.

Smith's evidence might be that Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford. Let us imagine, now, that Smith has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally ignorant. Smith selects three place-names quite at random, and constructs the following three propositions:

(g) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston;

#### Page 3

123 CIRCULARITY AND INDUCTION

(h) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona; (i) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.

Each of these propositions is entailed by (f). Imagine that Smith realizes the entailment of each of these propositions he has constructed by (f), and proceeds to accept (g), (h), and (i) on the basis of (f). Smith has correctly inferred (g), (h), and (i) from a proposition for which he has strong evidence. Smith is therefore completely justified in believing each of these three propositions. Smith, of course, has no idea where Brown is.

But imagine now that two further conditions hold. First, Jones does not own a Ford, but is at present driving a rented car. And secondly, by the sheerest coincidence, and entirely unknown to Smith, the place mentioned in proposition (h) happens really to be the place where Brown is. If these two conditions hold then Smith does not know that (h) is true, even though (i) (h) is true, (ii) Smith does believe that (h) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (h) is true.

These two examples show that definition (a) does not state a szflcient condition for someone's knowing a given proposition. The same cases, with appropriate changes, will suffice to show that neither definition (b) nor definition (c) do so either.

Wqne State Universit_r

CIRCULARITY AND INDUCTION

ECENTLY1 I suggested why an argument proposed by Max '. R Black, which attempts to support an inductive rule by citing its past success, suffers from circularity. The inductive rule under discussion is this :

R : To argue from Most instances of As examined z/n&r a wide variety of conditions have been B to (probably) The next A to be encoznteredwi/I be B.

The argument in favour of the rule is as follows:

(a) : In most instances of the use of R in arguments with true prernisses examined in a wide variety of conditions, R has been successful.

Hence (probabb) : In the next instance to be encountered of use of R in an argument with a true premiss, R will be successful. " The Circularity of a Self-Suppotting Inductive Argument ", ANALYSIS, 22.6(June 1%2).

CIRCULARITY AND INDUCTION 123

(h) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona; (i) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.

Each of these propositions is entailed by (f). Imagine that Smith realizes the entailment of each of these propositions he has constructed by (f), and proceeds to accept (g), (h), and (i) on the basis of (f). Smith has correcdy inferred (g), (h), and (i) from a proposition for which he has strong evidence. Smith is therefore completely justified in believing each of these three propositions. Smith, of course, has no idea where Brown is. But imagine now that two further conditions hold. First, Jones does not own a Ford, but is at present driving a rented car. And secondly, by the sheerest coincidence, and entirely unknown to Smith, the place mentioned in proposition (h) happens really to be the place where Brown is. If these two conditions hold then Smith does not know that (h) is true, even though (i) (h) is true, (ii) Smith does believe that (h) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (h) is true. These two examples show that definition (a) does not state a sufficient condition for someone's knowing a given proposition. The same cases, with appropriate changes, will suffice to show that neither definition (b) nor definition (c) do so either.

wayne State University

CIRCULARITY AND INDUCTION

By PETER ACHINSTEIN

1. DECENTL yl I suggested why an argument proposed by Max .n. Black, which attempts to support an inductive rule by citing its past success, suffers from circularity. The inductive rule under discussion is this:

R: To argue from Most instances of As examined under a 11Iide variety of conditions have been B to (probably) The next A to be encountered 11Iil/ be B.

The argument in favour of the rule is as follows:

(a): In most instances of the use ofR in arguments with true premisses examined in a wide variety of conditions, R has been successful. Hence (probablY): In the next instance to be encountered of use of R in an argument with a true premiss, R will be successful. 1 " The Circularity of II Self-Supporting Inductive Argument "0 ANALYSIS, 22.6 (June 1962).

---

Source: [Fermat's Library](https://fermatslibrary.com/) — https://fermatslibrary.com/s/is-justified-true-belief-knowledge. More annotated papers: https://fermatslibrary.com/llms.txt
