lower “value quality”. That is, the public may learn to demand better quality of that which
CAN be managed to be of better quality or which can be managed to be of the lower quality
observed in so many of the various national currencies in the 20th century.
So here is the possibility of “asymptotically ideal money”. Starting with the idea of
value stabilization in relation to a domestic price index associated with the territory of one
state, beyond that there is the natural and logical concept of internationally based value
comparisons. The currencies being compared, like now the euro, the dollar, the yen, the
pound, the swiss franc, the swedish kronor, etc. can be viewed with critical eyes by their
users and by those who may have the option of whether or not or how to use one of them.
This can lead to pressure for good quality and consequently for a lessened rate of inﬂationary
depreciation in value.
Illustrating the principle of these optional choices, the people of Sweden recently had the
opportunity of voting in a referendum on whether or not Sweden should join the eurocurrency
bloc and replace the kronor by the euro and thus use the same currency as Finland. The
people voted against that, for various reasons. But it cannot be irrelevant whether or not
the future quality of a currency is really assured or whether instead that it depends on the
shifting sands of political decisions or the possibly arbitrary actions of a bureaucracy of
The voters in the U.K. are expecting to have the opportunity to vote in a referendum
relating to the adoption, for the U.K., of the euro (which is already adopted in Ireland).
Here they have a dramatic conﬂict, since the pound was the original currency of “the gold
standard”, with its value pegged to gold in 1717 by Isaac Newton who was then Master
of the Mint. (Of course it was not irrelevant that George II, the king then, was an early
Hanoverian and also ruled territories in Germany.)
In recent years the pound has had a comparatively good rating with regard to inﬂation,
inferior to the rating of the swiss franc but superior to most currencies of the world. So the
British have the alternatives of accepting adoption of the euro when ﬁrst voting, or after a
delay, or never.
We can legitimately wonder how the speediness of its adoption or delays in its adoption
might aﬀect the policies operating to control the actual exchange value of the euro. The
constitutional structure of the authority behind the euro is of the “paper money” character
in that nothing is really guaranteed as far as the value of the euro is concerned. But this is
typical of all currencies used in the world nowadays.
Of course when a currency, for a time, does have a speciﬁcation of its value beyond the
local ﬁat of administrators in its national home, like the money of Argentina had a peg to the
U.S. dollar a few years ago, then international observers can wisely distrust the reliability of
such a stabilization of its value. Such forms of value deﬁnition are not necessarily unsound,
particularly when a small economy, like that of Panama, links its currency to that of a larger
area like that of the USA. But it is obvious that this sort of thing puts a burden on the
foundation of the currency that is used as a reference basis.