
manufacturers
whose programmers
and
engineers bear· a
similar relationship. )
system
management
The
structures of large systems
tend
to
disintegrate dur-
ing
development,
qualitatively
more
so
than
with
small
systems. This observation
is
strikingly
evident
when
ap-
plied
to
the
large military information systems of
the
last
dozen
years; these are some of
the
most complex objects
devised
by
the
mind
of
man. An activity called "system
management"
has
sprung
up
partially in response to this
tendency
of
systems to disintegrate.
Let
us examine
the
utility to system
management
of
the
concepts
we
have
developed
here.
Why
do
large systems disintegrate?
The
process seems
to
occur in
three
steps,
the
first two
of
which
are controllable
and
the
third
of
which
is
a
direct
result
of
our
homomor-
phism.
First,
the
realization
by
the initial designers
that
the
system will
be
large,
together
with
certain
pressures in
their organization,
make
irresistible
the
temptation
to as-
sign too
many
people
to a design effort.
Second, application of
the
conventional wisdom of
man-
agement
to
a large
ddign
organization causes its commu-
nication
structure
to disintegrate.
Third,
the
homomorphism insures
that
the
structure
of
the
system will reflect
the
disintegration which
has
oc-
curred
in the. design organization.
Let
us first
examine
the
tendency
to
overpopulate
a
design effort.
It
is
a
natural
temptation
of
the
initial de-
signer-the
one
whose preliminary design concepts influ-
ence
the
organization
of
the
design
effort-to
delegate
tasks
when
the
apparent
complexity of
the
system ap-
proaches his limits
of
comprehension. This
is
the
turning
point in
the
course of
the
design.
Either
he
struggles to
reduce
the
system to comprehensibility
and
wins,
or
else
he
loses control
of
it.
The
outcome
is
almost
predictable
if
there
is
schedule
pressure
and
a
budget
to
be
managed.
A
manager
knows
that
he
will
be
vulnerable to
the
charge
of
mismanagement
if
he
misses his schedule
without
having
applied
all his resources .. This knowledge creates a
strong
pressure
on
the
initial designer
who
might
prefer
to
wrestle
with
the
design
rather
than
fragment
it
by
delega-
tion,
but
he
is
made
to feel
that
the
cost
of
risk
is
too
high
to take
the
chance. Therefore,
he
is
forced to
delegate
in
order
to
bring
more
resources to
bear.
The
following case illustrates
another
but
related
way
in
which
the
environment
of
the
manager
can
be
in conflict
with
the
integrity of
the
system
being
designed.
A
manager
must
subcontract
a crucial
and
difficult de-
sign task.
He
has a choice
of
two contractors, a small
new
organization
which
proposes
an
intuitively
appealing
ap-
proach for
much
less
money
than
is
budgeted,
and
an
established
but
conventional outfit
which
is asking a more
"realistic" fee.
He
knows
that
if
the
bright
young
organiza-
tion fails to
produce
adequate
results,
he
will
be
accused
of
mismanagement,
whereas
if
the
established outfit fails,
it
will
be
evidence
that
the
problem
is
indeed
a difficult
one.
What
is
the
difficulty
here?
A
large
part
of
it
relates
to
the kind
of
reasoning
about
measurement
of resources
which arises from conventional
accounting
theory. Accord-
ing
to
this theory,
the
unit
of
resource
is
the
dollar,
and
all
resources
must
be
measured
using units
of
measurement
which are convertible to
the
dollar.
If
the
resource
is
human
effort,
the
unit of
measurement
is
the
number
of
hours worked
by
each
man
times his
hourly
cost,
summed
up
for
the
whole working force.
One
fallacy
behind
this calculation is
the
property
of
linearity which says
that
two
men
working for a year
or
one
hundred
men
working for a
week
(at
the
same
hourly cost
April
1968
per
man)
are resources of
equal
value. Assuming
that
two
men
and
one
hundred
men
cannot
work in
the
same orga-
nizational
structure
(this
is
intuitively
evident
and
will
be
discussed
below)
our
homomorphism says
that
they will
not design similar systems; therefore
the
value of their
efforts
may
not
even
be
comparable.
From
experience
we
know
that
the
two men,
if
they
are well chosen
and
survive
the experience, will give us a
better
system. Assumptions
which
may
be
adequate
for peeling potatoes
and
erecting
brick walls fail for designing systems.
Parkinson's
Law
3
plays an
important
role in
the
overas-
signment
of
design effort. As long as
the
manager's
prestige
and
power
are
tied
to
the
size
of
his
budget,
he
will
be
motivated
to
expand
his organization. This is
an
inappro-
priate
motive
in
the
management
of a system design activ-
ity.
Once
the
organization exists,
of
course,
it
will
be
used.
Probably
the
greatest
single common factor
behind
many
poorly
designed
systems
now
in existence
has
been
the
availability of a design organization in
need
of
work.
The
second
step
in
the
disintegration
of
a system de-
sign-the
fragmentation
of
the
design organization's com-
munication
structure-begins
as soon
as
delegation
has
started.
Elementary
probability
theory tells us
that
the
number
of
possible communication
paths
in
an
organiza-
tion
is
approximately
half
the
square
of
the
number
of
people
in
the
organization.
Even
in a
moderately
small
organization
it
becomes necessary to restrict communica-
tion in
order
that
people
can
get
some "work" done. Re-
search
which
leads to
techniques
permitting
more
efficient
communication
among
designers will
play
an
extremely
important
role in
the
technology
of
system
management.
Common
management
practice
places
certain
numerical
constraints
on
the
complexity of
the
linear
graph
which
represents
the
administrative
structure
of a military-style
organization. Specifically,
each
individual
must
have
at
most
one
superior
and
at
most approximately seven sub-
ordinates.
To
the
extent
that
organizational protocol re-
stricts communication
along· lines of
command,
the
com-
munication
structure
of
an
organization will resemble its
administrative structure. This
is
one
reason
why
military-
style organizations design systems
which
look like their
organization charts.
conclusion
The
basic thesis
of
this article
is
that
organizations
which
design systems
(in
the
broad
sense
used
here)
are
constrained to
produce
designs which
are
copies
of
the
communication structures
of
these organizations.
We
have
seen
that
this fact has
important
implications for
the
man-
agement
of
system design. Primarily,
we
have
found
a
criterion for
the
structuring
of design organizations: a de-
sign effort should
be
organized
according
to
the
need
for
communication.
This criterion creates
problems
because
the
need
to
communicate
at
any time
depends
on
the
system concept
in effect
at
that
time. Because
the
design
which
occurs first
is almost never
the
best
possible,
the
prevailing system
concept
may
need
to change. Therefore, flexibility
of
orga-
nization is
important
to effective design.
Ways
must
be
found
to
reward
design
managers
for
keeping
their organizations
lean
and
flexible.
There
is
need
for a philosophy of system design
management
whiCh
is
not
based
on
the
assumption
that
adding
manpower
simply
adds to productivity.
The
development
of
such
a philoso-
phy
promises to
unearth
basic questions
about
value
of
resources
and
techniques of communication
which
will
need
to
be
answered
before
our system-building technology
.
can
proceed
with
confidence. •
8
C.
Northcote
Parkinson, Parkinson's Law
and
Other
Studies
in
Admin-
istration (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1957).
31