Melvin Conway in an American computer scientist and entrepreneur wh...
This is really the core of Conway's argument. This relationship bet...
This reminds me of Tom West's assessment of the VAX as described in...
In reference to theory, do you know if the author opinion was that ...
Interestingly enough, the year of publishing of this paper (1967) ...
The author of this paper made significant contributions to compiler...
A homomorphism is a mathematical concept that describes a relations...
In this context a translator of programming languages is a generic ...
Fred Brooks, author of "The Mythical Man-Month" knew this, after ma...
HOW DO
COMMITTEES
INVENT?
by
MELVIN
E.
CONWAY
That
kind
of
intellectual activity
which
creates
a
useful whole from its diverse
parts
may
be
called
the
design
of
a system.
Whether
the
particular activity
is
the
creation of specifica-
tions for a major
weapon
system,
the
formation of a rec-
ommendation
to
meet
a social challenge,
or
the
program-
ming
of
a
computer,
the
general
activity
is
largely
the
same.
Typically,
the
objective
of
a design organization is
the
creation
and
assembly
of
a
document
containing a coherent-
ly
structured
body
of
information.
We
may
name
this
information
the
system design.
It
is typically
produced
for
a sponsor
who
usually desires to
carry
out
some activity
guided
by
the
system design.
For
example, a
public
official
may
wish to propose legislation to
avert
a
recurrence
of a
recent
disaster, so
he
appoints
a team to explain
the
catas-
trophe.
Or
a
manufacturer
needs
a
new
product
and
desig-
nates
a
product
planning
activity to specify
what
should
be
introduced.
The
design organization
may
or
may
not
be
involved in
the
construction
of
the
system
it
designs.
Frequently,
in
public
affairs,
there
are
policies
which
discourage a group's
acting
upon
its
own
recommendations, whereas, in
private
industry,
quite
the
opposite situation
often
prevails.
It
seems reasonable to
suppose
that
the
knowledge
that
one
will
have
to carry
out
one's
own
recommendations
or
that
this task will fall to others,
probably
affects some
design choices
which
the
individual designer
is
cailed
upon
to make. Most design activity requires continually making
choices.
Many
of
these choices
may
be
more
than
design
decisions;
they
may
also
be
personal decisions
the
designer
makes
about
his
own
future.
As
we
shall see later,
the
incentives
which
exist
in
a conventional
management
en-
vironment
can
motivate choices
which
subvert
the
intent
of
the
sponsor.!
stages
of
design
The
initial stages .
of
a design effort
are
concerned
more
with structuring
of
the
design activity
than
with
the
system
itsel£.2
The
full-blown design activity
cannot
proceed
until
certain preliminary milestones
are
passed.
These
include:
1.
Understanding
of
the
boun9aries,
both
on
the
design
activity
and
on
the
system to
be
designed,
placed
by
the
sponsor
and
by
the
worltl's realities.
2.
Achievement of a preliminary notion
of
the
system's
organization so
that
design task
groups
can
be
mean-
ingfully assigned.
We
shall see in detail later
that
the
very
act
of
organiz-
1 A
related,
but
much more comprehensive discussion of the
behavior
of
system-designing
organizations
is
found
in
John Kenneth
Galbraith's,
The
New
Industrial
State
(Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1967) .
See
especially
Chapter
VI, "The Technostructur<!."
2 For o discussion of the problems which
may
arise
when
the
design
activity
takes
the
form of o project in a functional environment, see
C.
J.
Middleton,
"How
to Set
Up
o Project
Organization,"
Harvard Business
Review, March-April, 1967, p. 73.
28
design
organization
criteria
ing a design
team
means
that
certain design decisions have
already
been
made,
explicitly
or
otherwise. Given
any
design team organization,
there
is
a class
of
design alterna-
tives
which
cannot
be
effectively
pursued
by
such
an
organization
because
the
necessary communication
paths
do
not
exist. Therefore,
there
is
no
such
thing
as a design
group
which
is
both
organized
and
unbiased.
Once
the
organization
of
the
design team is chosen, it
is
possible to
delegate
activities to
the
subgroups
of
the
organization.
Every
time a
delegation
is
made
and
some-
body's scope
of
inquiry is narrowed,
the
class
of
design
alternatives
which
can
be
effectively
pursued
is
also nar-
rowed.
Once
scopes
of
activity
are
defined, a coordination prob-
lem
is
created. Coordination
among
task groups,
although
it
appears
to lower
the
productivity
of
the
individual in
the
small group, provides
the
only possibility
that
the
separate
task groups will
be
able
to consolidate their efforts into a
unified system design.
Thus
the
life cycle of a system design effort proceeds
through
the
following
general
stages:
1.
Drawing
of
boundaries
according to
the
ground
rules.
2.
Choice
of
a preliminary system concept.
3.
Organization
of
the
design activity
and
delegation of
tasks
according
to
that
concept.
4. Coordination
among
delegated
tasks.
5. Consolidation
of
subdesigns into a single design .
It
is
possible
that
a given design activity will
not
pro-
ceed
straight
through
this list.
It
might
conceivably reorga-
nize
upon
discovery
of
a
new,
and
obviously superior,
design
concept;
but
such
an
appearance
of
uncertainty
is
unflattering,
and
the
very
act
of
voluntarily
abandoning
a
creation
is
painful
and
expensive.
Of
course, from
the
Dr.
Conway
is
manager,
pe-
ripheral
systems
research,
at
Sperry
Rand's
Univac Div.,
where
he
is
working
on
recog-
nition
of
continuous
speech.
He
has
previously
been
a
research
associate
at
Case
Western
Re-
serve
Univ.,
and
a
software
consultant
. . He
has
an
MS
in
physics from CaiTech
and
a
PhD
in
math
from
Case.
:C»ATAMATION
vantage
point
of
the
historian,
the
process
is
continually
repeating.
This
point
of
view
has
produced
the
observation
that
there's
never
enough
time to do
something
right,
but
there's always
enough
time to do
it
over.
the
designed
system
Any system
of
consequence
is
structured
from smaller
subsystems
which
are
interconnected.
A description of a
system, if
it
is
to describe
what
goes
on
inside
that
system,
must
describe
the
system's connections to
the
outside
world,
and
it
must
delineate
each
of
the
subsystems
and
how
they
are
interconnected.
Dropping
down
one
level,
we
can
say
the
same
for
each
of
the
subsystems, viewing it as a
system. This
reduction
in scope
can
continue
until
we
are
down
to a system
which
is
simple
enough
to
be
understood
without
further
subdivision.
Examples. A
transcontinental
public
transportation
sys-
tem consists
of
buses, trains, airplanes, various
types
of
right-of-way,
parking
lots, taxicabs, terminals,
and
so on.
This
is
a very
heterogeneous
system;
that
is,
the
subsys-
tems
are
quite
diverse.
Dropping
down
one
level, an air-
plane, for example,
may
possess subsystems for
structure,
propulsion,
power
distribution, communication,
and
pay-
load
packaging.
The
propulsion subsystem has fuel, igni-
tion,
and
starting
subsystems, to
name
a few.
It
may
be
less obvious
that
a
theory
is
a system
in
the
same
sense.
It
relates to
the
outside
world
of
observed
events
where
it
must
explain, or
at
least
not
contradict,
them.
It
consists of subtheories
which
must
relate
to
each
other
in
the
same
way.
For
example,
the
investigation
of
an
airplane
crash
attempts
to
produce
a
theory
explaining a
complex
event.
It
can
consist of subtheories
describing
the
path
of
the
aircraft, its radio communications,
the
manner
of its
damage,
and
its relationship to
nearby
objects
at
the
time of
the
event.
Each
of these, in
turn,
is
a story in itself
which
can
be
further
broken
down
into finer
detail
down
to
the
level
of
individual
units
of
evidence.
Linear graphs. Fig. 1 illustrates this view
of
a system as
a
linear
graph-a
Tinker-Toy
structure
with
branches
(the
lines)
and
nodes
(the
circles).
Each
node
is
a subsystem
which
communicates
with
other
subsystems along
the
branches.
In
turn,
each
subsystem
may
contain a
structure
which
may
be
similarly
portrayed.
The
term
interface,
which
is
becoming
popular
among
systems people, refers to
the
inter-subsystem communication
path
or
branch
repre-
sented
by
a line in Fig.
1.
Alternatively,
the
interface
is
the
plug
or flange
by
which
the
path
coming
out
of
one
node
couples to
the
path
coming
out
of
another
node.
relating
the
two
The
linear-graph
notation
is
useful
because
it
provides
an
abstraction which has the same form for
the
two
entities
we
are
considering:
the
design
organization
and
the
system
it
designs. This
can
be
illustrated
in Fig. 1
by
replacing
the
following words:
1.
Replace "system"
by
"committee."
2. Replace "subsystem"
by
"subcommittee."
3. Replace
"interface"
by
"coordinator."
Just
as
with
systems,
we
find
that
design groups
can
be
viewed
at
several levels
of
complication.
The
Federal
Gov-
ernment,
for example,
is
an
excellent
example
of
a
design
organization
with
enough
complexity to satisfy
any
system
engineer. This
is
a
particularly
interesting
example
for
showing
the
similarity of
the
two concepts
being
studied
here
because
the
Federal
Government
is
both
a design
organization
(designing
laws, treaties,
and
policies)
and
a
designed
system
(the
Constitution
being
the
principal
pre-
liminary design
document)
.
A basic relationship.
We
are
now
in a position to
address
the
fundamental
question
of
this article: Is
there
any
pre-
April
1968
dictable
relationship
between
the
graph
structure
of a
design
organization
and
the
graph
structure
of
the
system
it
designs?
The
answer
is: Yes,
the
relationship
is
so simple
that
in
some cases it is
an
identity.
Consider
the
following
"proof":
Let
us choose arbitrarily some system
and
the
orga-
nization
which
designed
it,
and
let us
then
choose
equally
arbitrarily some level of complication of
the
designed
system for
which
we
can
draw
a
graph.
(Our
motivation for this arbitrariness
is
that
if
we
succeed
in
demonstrating
anything
interesting,
it
will
hold
true
for any design organization
and
level of
complication.)
Fig.
2 ( p.
30)
shows, for illustration
purposes
only, a
structure
to
which
the
following state-
ments
may
be
related.
For
any
node
x in
the
system
we
can
identify a
design
group
of
the
design organization
which
de-
signed
x; call this
X.
Therefore,
by
generalization of
this process, for
every
node
of
the
system
we
have
a
rule for finding a
corresponding
node
of
the
design
1
Interfaces~
4
.Subsystem
a
Fig.
1
Figure
1
The
system,
shown
at
the
top,
communicates
with
the
outside
world
through
the
three
inter-
faces
1,
2,
and
3.
The
middle
figure
shows
the
major
subsys-
tems,
two
of
which
are
shown
in
detail
at
the
bottom.
Subsystem
b
organization. Notice
that
this rule
is
not
necessarily
one-to-one;
that
is,
the
two
subsystems
might
have
been
designed
by
a single design group.
Interestingly,
we
can
make
a similar
statement
about
branches.
Take
any
two
nodes
x
and
y of
the
system.
Either
they
are
joined
by
a
branch
or
they
are
not.
(That
is,
either
they
communicate
with
each
other
in
some
way
meaningful
to
the
operation
of
the
system
or
they
do
not.)
If
there
is
a
branch,
then
the
two
(not
necessarily
distinct)
design groups X
and
Y
which
designed
the
two
nodes
must
have
negotiated
and
agreed
upon
an
interface
specification to
permit
communication
between
the
two
corresponding
nodes
of
the
design organization.
If,
on
the
other
hand,
there
is
no
branch
between
x
and
y,
then
the
subsystems do
not
communicate
with
each
other,
there
was
nothing
for
the
two
corresponding
design groups to
negotiate,
29
COMMITTEES
...
and
therefore
there
is
no
branch
between
X
and
Y.
*
What
have
we
just shown? Roughly speaking,
we
have
demonstrated
that
there
is
a very close relationship
be-
tween
the
structure of a system
and
the
structure
of
the
organization
which
designed
it. In
the
not
unusual
case
where
each
subsystem
had
its
own
separate
design group,
we
find
that
the
structures (i.e.,
the
linear
graphs)
of
the
~3
1
Subsystem
a
First,
choose
a
system
(to
left)
and
its
designer
(to
right).
DESIGN ORGANIZATION
Then
choose
some
level
of
complication
within
the
system
(below).
Coordinator
-
Figure
2
Here
is
an
illustration
of
the
strong
relation-
ship
between
the
structure
(graph)
of
a
system
(left}
and
the
structure
of
the
organization
which
designed
it
(right).
Fig.
2
design
group
and
the
system are identical.
In
the case
where some
group
designed
more
than
one subsystem
we
find
that
the
structure
of
the
design organization
is
a
collapsed version of
the
structure
of
the
system,
with
the
subsystems having
the
same
design
group
collapsing into
one
node
representing
that
group.
This kind of a structure-preserving relationship
between
two sets of things is called a homomorphism. Speaking as a
mathematician
might,
we
would
say
that
there
is
a homo-
morphism from
the
linear
graph
of a system to
the
linear
graph
of
its design organization.
systems
image
their
design
groups
It
is an article of faith
among
experienced
system de-
signers
that
given any system design, someone someday
will find a
better
one to
do
the
same
job.
In
other
words,
it
is
misleading
and
incorrect to speak of the design for a
specific job, unless this
is
understood
in
the
context
of
space, time, knowledge,
and
technology.
The
humility
which this belief should impose on system designers is
the
only
appropriate
posture
for those who
read
history or
consult their
memorie~.
The
design progress of
computer
translators of
program-
ming languages such as
FORTRAN
and
COBOL
is a case in
*This
claim may
be
viewed
several
ways.
It
may
be
trivial,
hinging
on
the
definition of
meaningful
negotiation.
Or,
it
may
be
the
result of
the
observation
that
one design
group
almost never
will
compromise
its
own
design
to
meet
the
needs
of
another
group
unless
absolutely
imperative.
30
point. In the
middle
fifties,
when
the
prototypes
of these
languages
appeared,
their compilers
were
even
more cum-
bersome objects
than
the
giant
(for
then)
computers
which
were
required
for their execution.
Today,
these translators
are only historical curiosities,
bearing
no resemblance in
design to today's compilers.
(We
should take
particular
note
of the fact
that
the
quantum
jumps in compiler design
progress
were
associated with
the
appearance
of
new
groups
of
people
on territory previously
trampled
chiefly
by
com-
puter
manufacturers-first
it was
the
tight
little university
research team, followed
by
the
independent
software
house.)
If,
then,
it
is
reasonable to assume
that
for any system
requirement
there
is
a family of system designs
which
will
meet
that
requirement,
we
must
also
inquire
whether
the
choice of design organization influences
the
process of
selection of a system design from
that
family.
If
we
believe
our homomorphism,
then
we
must
agree
that
it
does.
To
the
extent
that
an
organization
is
not
completely flexible in
its communication structure,
that
organization will
stamp
out
an
image
of itself in every design it produces.
The
larger an organization is, the less flexibility
it
has
and
the
more
pronounced
is
the
phenomenon.
Examples. A
contract
research organization
had
eight
people
who
were
to
produce
a
COBOL
and
an
ALGOL
com-
piler.
After
some initial estimates of difficulty
and
time, five
people
were
assigned to
the
COBOL
job
and
three
to
the
ALGOL
job.
The
resulting
COBOL
compiler
ran
in five phases,
the
ALGOL
compiler ran
in
three.
Tvvo
militarv services
were
directed
bv
their
Commander-
in-Chief to de'velop a common
weapon
~ystem
to
meet
their
DESIGN
OR@ANIZATION
Common
logistics
Common
logistics
agency
Weapons
special
Weapons
special
Service
A
to
Service
A
to
Service
B
Application
program
System
software
System
hardware
~
3.a. A
Weapon
System
User
Mfr.
3b.
A
Computer
System
Service
B
user's
progranuners
System
prograrrnners
Engineers
Figure
3
Two
examples
of
identity
of
structure
between
a
system
and
its
design
organization.
Figs.
3a and
3b
respective needs. After
great
effort
they
produced
a
copy
of
their
organization chart.
(See
Fig.
3a.)
Consider
the
operating
computer
system in use solving a
problem. At a
high
level
of
examination, it consists of
three
parts:
the
hardware,
the
system software,
and
the
applica-
tion
program.
(See
Fig.
3b.)
Corresponding
to these sub-
systems
are
their
respective designers:
the
computer
manu-
facturer's engineers, his system programmers,
and
the
user's application programmers.
(Those
rare instances
where
the
system
hardware
and
software
tend
to cooperate
rather
than
merely
tolerate
each
other
are associated with
CIRTRMRTICN
manufacturers
whose programmers
and
engineers bear· a
similar relationship. )
system
management
The
structures of large systems
tend
to
disintegrate dur-
ing
development,
qualitatively
more
so
than
with
small
systems. This observation
is
strikingly
evident
when
ap-
plied
to
the
large military information systems of
the
last
dozen
years; these are some of
the
most complex objects
devised
by
the
mind
of
man. An activity called "system
management"
has
sprung
up
partially in response to this
tendency
of
systems to disintegrate.
Let
us examine
the
utility to system
management
of
the
concepts
we
have
developed
here.
Why
do
large systems disintegrate?
The
process seems
to
occur in
three
steps,
the
first two
of
which
are controllable
and
the
third
of
which
is
a
direct
result
of
our
homomor-
phism.
First,
the
realization
by
the initial designers
that
the
system will
be
large,
together
with
certain
pressures in
their organization,
make
irresistible
the
temptation
to as-
sign too
many
people
to a design effort.
Second, application of
the
conventional wisdom of
man-
agement
to
a large
ddign
organization causes its commu-
nication
structure
to disintegrate.
Third,
the
homomorphism insures
that
the
structure
of
the
system will reflect
the
disintegration which
has
oc-
curred
in the. design organization.
Let
us first
examine
the
tendency
to
overpopulate
a
design effort.
It
is
a
natural
temptation
of
the
initial de-
signer-the
one
whose preliminary design concepts influ-
ence
the
organization
of
the
design
effort-to
delegate
tasks
when
the
apparent
complexity of
the
system ap-
proaches his limits
of
comprehension. This
is
the
turning
point in
the
course of
the
design.
Either
he
struggles to
reduce
the
system to comprehensibility
and
wins,
or
else
he
loses control
of
it.
The
outcome
is
almost
predictable
if
there
is
schedule
pressure
and
a
budget
to
be
managed.
A
manager
knows
that
he
will
be
vulnerable to
the
charge
of
mismanagement
if
he
misses his schedule
without
having
applied
all his resources .. This knowledge creates a
strong
pressure
on
the
initial designer
who
might
prefer
to
wrestle
with
the
design
rather
than
fragment
it
by
delega-
tion,
but
he
is
made
to feel
that
the
cost
of
risk
is
too
high
to take
the
chance. Therefore,
he
is
forced to
delegate
in
order
to
bring
more
resources to
bear.
The
following case illustrates
another
but
related
way
in
which
the
environment
of
the
manager
can
be
in conflict
with
the
integrity of
the
system
being
designed.
A
manager
must
subcontract
a crucial
and
difficult de-
sign task.
He
has a choice
of
two contractors, a small
new
organization
which
proposes
an
intuitively
appealing
ap-
proach for
much
less
money
than
is
budgeted,
and
an
established
but
conventional outfit
which
is asking a more
"realistic" fee.
He
knows
that
if
the
bright
young
organiza-
tion fails to
produce
adequate
results,
he
will
be
accused
of
mismanagement,
whereas
if
the
established outfit fails,
it
will
be
evidence
that
the
problem
is
indeed
a difficult
one.
What
is
the
difficulty
here?
A
large
part
of
it
relates
to
the kind
of
reasoning
about
measurement
of resources
which arises from conventional
accounting
theory. Accord-
ing
to
this theory,
the
unit
of
resource
is
the
dollar,
and
all
resources
must
be
measured
using units
of
measurement
which are convertible to
the
dollar.
If
the
resource
is
human
effort,
the
unit of
measurement
is
the
number
of
hours worked
by
each
man
times his
hourly
cost,
summed
up
for
the
whole working force.
One
fallacy
behind
this calculation is
the
property
of
linearity which says
that
two
men
working for a year
or
one
hundred
men
working for a
week
(at
the
same
hourly cost
April
1968
per
man)
are resources of
equal
value. Assuming
that
two
men
and
one
hundred
men
cannot
work in
the
same orga-
nizational
structure
(this
is
intuitively
evident
and
will
be
discussed
below)
our
homomorphism says
that
they will
not design similar systems; therefore
the
value of their
efforts
may
not
even
be
comparable.
From
experience
we
know
that
the
two men,
if
they
are well chosen
and
survive
the experience, will give us a
better
system. Assumptions
which
may
be
adequate
for peeling potatoes
and
erecting
brick walls fail for designing systems.
Parkinson's
Law
3
plays an
important
role in
the
overas-
signment
of
design effort. As long as
the
manager's
prestige
and
power
are
tied
to
the
size
of
his
budget,
he
will
be
motivated
to
expand
his organization. This is
an
inappro-
priate
motive
in
the
management
of a system design activ-
ity.
Once
the
organization exists,
of
course,
it
will
be
used.
Probably
the
greatest
single common factor
behind
many
poorly
designed
systems
now
in existence
has
been
the
availability of a design organization in
need
of
work.
The
second
step
in
the
disintegration
of
a system de-
sign-the
fragmentation
of
the
design organization's com-
munication
structure-begins
as soon
as
delegation
has
started.
Elementary
probability
theory tells us
that
the
number
of
possible communication
paths
in
an
organiza-
tion
is
approximately
half
the
square
of
the
number
of
people
in
the
organization.
Even
in a
moderately
small
organization
it
becomes necessary to restrict communica-
tion in
order
that
people
can
get
some "work" done. Re-
search
which
leads to
techniques
permitting
more
efficient
communication
among
designers will
play
an
extremely
important
role in
the
technology
of
system
management.
Common
management
practice
places
certain
numerical
constraints
on
the
complexity of
the
linear
graph
which
represents
the
administrative
structure
of a military-style
organization. Specifically,
each
individual
must
have
at
most
one
superior
and
at
most approximately seven sub-
ordinates.
To
the
extent
that
organizational protocol re-
stricts communication
along· lines of
command,
the
com-
munication
structure
of
an
organization will resemble its
administrative structure. This
is
one
reason
why
military-
style organizations design systems
which
look like their
organization charts.
conclusion
The
basic thesis
of
this article
is
that
organizations
which
design systems
(in
the
broad
sense
used
here)
are
constrained to
produce
designs which
are
copies
of
the
communication structures
of
these organizations.
We
have
seen
that
this fact has
important
implications for
the
man-
agement
of
system design. Primarily,
we
have
found
a
criterion for
the
structuring
of design organizations: a de-
sign effort should
be
organized
according
to
the
need
for
communication.
This criterion creates
problems
because
the
need
to
communicate
at
any time
depends
on
the
system concept
in effect
at
that
time. Because
the
design
which
occurs first
is almost never
the
best
possible,
the
prevailing system
concept
may
need
to change. Therefore, flexibility
of
orga-
nization is
important
to effective design.
Ways
must
be
found
to
reward
design
managers
for
keeping
their organizations
lean
and
flexible.
There
is
need
for a philosophy of system design
management
whiCh
is
not
based
on
the
assumption
that
adding
manpower
simply
adds to productivity.
The
development
of
such
a philoso-
phy
promises to
unearth
basic questions
about
value
of
resources
and
techniques of communication
which
will
need
to
be
answered
before
our system-building technology
.
can
proceed
with
confidence. •
8
C.
Northcote
Parkinson, Parkinson's Law
and
Other
Studies
in
Admin-
istration (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1957).
31
Interestingly enough, the year of publishing of this paper (1967) was the year when when flight recorders (aka "Black Boxes") were mandated by leading aviation countries. These would become seminal in understanding causes of airplane crashes.
Melvin Conway in an American computer scientist and entrepreneur who coined the term "Conway's Law", which states that "any organization that designs a system will inevitably produce a design whose structure is a copy of the organization's communication structure." Conway's Law has been cited as a major influence on the fields of software engineering and organizational design. In addition to this work, Conway made significant contributions to compiler design.
Conway received a MS degree in Physics from the California Institute of Technology and obtained a Ph.D. Mathematics from Case Western Reserve University in 1961.
This reminds me of Tom West's assessment of the VAX as described in the book, "The Soul of a New Machine". I wonder if West knew about this theory, or independently voiced it. Here are Tracy Kidder's words:
“Looking into the VAX, West had imagined he saw a diagram of DEC’s corporate organization. He felt that VAX was too complicated. He did not like, for instance, the system by which various parts of the machine communicated with each other; for his taste, there was too much protocol involved. He decided that VAX embodied flaws in DEC’s corporate organization. The machine expressed that phenomenally successful company’s cautious, bureaucratic style. Was this true? West said it didn’t matter, it was a useful theory.”
The author of this paper made significant contributions to compiler design. Conway is credited as having developed the concept of coroutines in compiler design, which allows using separate passes while debugging and then running a single pass compiler in production.
This is really the core of Conway's argument. This relationship between organization structure and system design would eventually be known as "Conway's Law".
A homomorphism is a mathematical concept that describes a relationship between two mathematical structures that are "similar" in some way.
More specifically in the field of graph theory, a graph homomorphism is a mapping between two graphs that respects their structure. In other words, it is a way of matching the vertices and edges of one graph to another graph so that the edges are connected in the same way.
In this context a translator of programming languages is a generic term that could refer to a compiler, assembler, or interpreter.
In reference to theory, do you know if the author opinion was that the Conway's law applies to scientific research as well as it does to design studios?
Fred Brooks, author of "The Mythical Man-Month" knew this, after making the mistake of putting too many people in the design group for OS/360. He says,
"It is a very humbling experience to make a multimillion-dollar mistake, but
it is also very memorable. I vividly recall the night we decided how to
organize the actual writing of external specifications for OS/360. The
manager of architecture, the manager of control program implementation, and
I were threshing out the plan, schedule, and division of responsibilities.
The architecture manager had 10 good men. He asserted that they
could write the specifications and do it right. It would take ten months,
three more than the schedule allowed.
The control program manager had 150 men. He asserted that they
could prepare the specifications, with the architecture team coordinating;
it would be well-done and practical, and he could do it on schedule.
Futhermore, if the architecture team did it, his 150 men would sit twiddling
their thumbs for ten months.
To this the architecture manager responded that if I gave the control
program team the responsibility, the result would not in fact be on time,
but would also be three months late, and of much lower quality. I did, and
it was. He was right on both counts. Moreover, the lack of conceptual
integrity made the system far more costly to build and change, and I would
estimate that it added a year to debugging time.
-- Frederick Brooks Jr., "The Mythical Man Month"