# Equilibrium points in n-person games

> An annotated edition of this paper on Fermat's Library, where scientists and readers explain its ideas, equations and history in the margins. Annotated edition: https://fermatslibrary.com/s/equilibrium-points-in-n-person-games

- **Authors:** John F. Nash, Jr.
- **Published:** 1949
- **Topic:** Economics
- **Original:** https://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/fermatslibrary/uploads%2F1648933267003-m2ez9m875o-d3a88bbc63f1cc5cf8e41e32ede055af%2Fnash_equilibrium_pnas.36.1.48.pdf
- **Pages:** 2
- **Annotations:** 7 comments in 7 threads
- **Featured:** Fermat's Library Journal Club
- **Annotated edition:** https://fermatslibrary.com/s/equilibrium-points-in-n-person-games

## Annotations

### Annotation 1 (page 1)

Beside the passage: “PRINCETON UNIVERSITY”

**Annotation** by Micael Oliveira (2022-04-03):

> ### TL;DR
>
>
> This short paper published in 1949 is one of the most influential papers published by John Nash. The ideas presented in this paper would lead to the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1994 (almost 45 years later).
>
> The simple insight underlying Nash's Equilibrium is the idea that:
> -  one cannot predict the choices of multiple players if one analyzes those decisions in isolation
> - one must consider what each player would do taking into account what they expect the others to do
> - Nash equilibrium requires that the player choices be consistent: no player wishes to undo their decision given what the others are deciding
>
> The ideas presented in this paper mark the beginning of Nash's work in Game Theory and influence much of the strategic thinking across disciplines to this day.
>
> ***Note: The Prisoner's Dilemma is a case where the Nash equilibrium is not the optimal outcome for both players.***

### Annotation 2 (page 1)

Beside the passage: “PRINCETON UNIVERSITY”

**Annotation** by Micael Oliveira (2022-04-03):

> John Forbes Nash Jr. was an American mathematician and ***the only person to be awarded both the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences and the Abel Prize.*** He made fundamental contributions to game theory, differential geometry, and the study of partial differential equations.
>
> !["Nash"](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a9/John_Forbes_Nash%2C_Jr._by_Peter_Badge.jpg)
> You can learn more about John Nash here: [John Forbes Nash Jr.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Forbes_Nash_Jr.)

### Annotation 3 (page 1)

Beside the passage: “Communicated by S. Lefschetz, November 16, 1949”

**Annotation** by Micael Oliveira (2022-04-05):

> John Nash was a mathematical genius. He is the only person to be awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics and the Abel Prize.
>
> Here is his recommendation letter for the graduate college at Princeton written in 1948.
>
> !["nash_recommendation"](https://i.imgur.com/RPf8qO4.jpg)

### Annotation 4 (page 1)

Beside the passage: “One may define a concept of an n-person game in which each player has a finite set of pure strategies and in which a definite set of payments to the n players corresponds to each n-tuple of pure strategies, one strategy being taken for each player. For mixed strategies, which are probability”

**Annotation** by Jayakumar S PhD (2022-04-08):

> Does these n-tuple converges ?

### Annotation 5 (page 1)

Beside the passage: “One may define a concept of an n-person game in which each player has a finite set of pure strategies and in which a definite set of payments to the n players corresponds to each n-tuple of pure strategies, one strategy being taken for each player. For mixed strategies, which are probability”

**Annotation** by Micael Oliveira (2022-04-03):

> **Fun fact:**
>
> The movie ["A Beautiful Mind"](https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0268978/) is an adaptation of a the biography ***"A Beautiful Mind: a Biography of John Forbes Nash, Jr., Winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, 1994"*** written by Sylvia Nasar.
>
> Here is a snippet of that movie that briefly explains the concept of the Nash Equilibrium:
>
> [![](https://i.imgur.com/YWmumac.png)](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CemLiSI5ox8)

### Annotation 6 (page 1)

Beside the passage: “Downloaded from https://www.pnas.org by 76.21.47.7 on April 2, 2022 from IP address 76.21.47.7.”

**Annotation** by Micael Oliveira (2022-04-03):

> Here is a brief lecture that gives an intuitive explanation of the "Nash equilibrium" using traffic signals as an example.
>
> **Game Theory 101: What Is a Nash Equilibrium?**
>
> [![](https://i.imgur.com/erVTWT2.png)](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0i7p9DNvtjk)

### Annotation 7 (page 2)

Beside the passage: “distributions over the pure strategies, the pay-off functions are the expectations of the players, thus becoming polylinear forms in the probabilities with which the various players play their various pure strategies. Any n-tuple of strategies, one for each player, may be regarded as a point in the product space …”

**Annotation** by Micael Oliveira (2022-04-05):

> The ***Prisoner's dilemma*** in game theory is a special manifestation of the Nash equilibrium.
>
> The dilemma stems from the fact that mutual cooperation would yield a better outcome for both players (than mutual defection) but is not the rational outcome. In this case the choice to cooperate from a self-interested perspective is irrational. This dilemma shows why ***two completely rational individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so. In this case the Nash equilibrium is not Pareto efficient.***
>
> You can learn more about the Prisonner's Dilemma here: [Game Theory 101: The Prisoner's Dilemma](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iZKErrvVMaY)

## Full text

Extracted from the PDF. [Annotation N] marks where each annotation above sits.

#### Page 1

MA THEMA TICS: J. F. NASH, JR.

This follows from the arguments used in a forthcoming paper."' It is proved by constructing an "abstract" mapping cylinder of X and transcribing into algebraic terms the proof of the analogous theorem on CWcomplexes.

* This note arose from consultations during the tenure of a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Fellowship by MacLane. ' Whitehead, J. H. C., "Combinatorial Homotopy I and II," Bull. A.M.S., 55, 214-245 and 453-496 (1949). We refer to these papers as CH I and CH II, respectively. ' By a complex we shall mean a connected CW complex, as defined in §5 of CH I. We do not restrict ourselres to finite complexes. A fixed 0-cell e° e KO will be the base point for all the homotopy groups in K. 4 MacLane, S., "Cohomology Theory in Abstract Groups III," Ann. Math., 50, 736-761 (1949), referred to as CT III. ' An (unpublished) result like Theorem 1 for the homotopy type was obtained prior to these results by J. A. Zilber. CT III uses in place of. equation (2.4) the stronger hypothesis that XB contains the center of A, but all the relevant developments there apply under the weaker assumption (2.4).

I Eilenberg, S., and MacLane, S., "Cohomology Theory in Abstract Groups II," Ann. Math., 48, 326-341 (1947). 8 Eilenberg, S., and MacLane, S., "Determination of the Second Homology ... by Means of Homotopy Invariants," these PROCEEDINGS, 32, 277-280 (1946). 9 Blakers, A. L., "Some Relations Between Homology and Homotopy Groups," Ann. Math., 49, 428-461 (1948), §12. 10 The hypothesis of Theorem C, requiring that v- (1) not be cyclic, can be readily realized by suitable choice of the free group X, but this hypothesis is not needed here (cf. 6). 11 Eilenberg, S., and MacLane, S., "Homology of Spaces with Operators II," Trans. A.M.S., 65, 49-99 (1949); referred to as HSO II. 12 C(k) here is the C(K) of CH II. Note that K exists and is a CW complex by (N) of p. 231 of CH I and that p-'K' - K", where p is the projection p:K -- K. 13 Whitehead, J. H. C., "Simple Homotopy Types." If W = 1, Theorem 5 follows from (17:3) on p. 155 of S. Lefschetz, Algebraic Topology, (New York, 1942) and arguments in §6 of J. H. C. Whitehead, "On Simply Connected 4-Dimensional Polyhedra" (Comm. Math. Helv., 22, 48-92 (1949)). However this proof cannot be generalized to the case W # 1.

EQUILIBRIUM POINTS IN N-PERSON GAMES

By JOHN F. NASH, JR.*

PRINCETON [Annotation 1] UNIVERSITY [Annotation 2]

Communicated by S. Lefschetz, [Annotation 3] November 16, 1949

One may define a concept of an n-person game in which each player has a finite set of pure strategies and in which a definite set of payments to the n players [Annotation 4] corresponds to each n-tuple of pure [Annotation 5] strategies, one strategy being taken for each player. For mixed strategies, which are probability

PROC. N. A. S. 48

Downloaded from https://www.pnas.org by 76.21.47.7 on April 2, 2022 from IP address 76.21.47.7. [Annotation 6]

#### Page 2

MA THEMATICS: G. POL YA

distributions over the pure strategies, the pay-off functions are the expectations of the players, thus becoming polylinear forms in the probabilities with which the various players play their various pure strategies. Any n-tuple of strategies, one for each player, may be regarded as a point in the product space obtained by multiplying then strategy spaces of the players. One:-such n-tuple counters another if the strategy of each player in the countering n-tuple yields the highest obtainable expectation for its player against, the n - 1 strategies of the other players in the countered n-tuple. A self-countering n-tuple is called an equilibrium point. The correspondence of each n-tuple with its set of countering n-tuples gives a one-to-many mapping of the product space into itself. From the definition of countering we-see that the set of countering points of a point is convex. By using the continuity of the pay-off functions we see that the graph of the mapping is closed. The closedness is equivalent to saying: if Pi, P2, ... and Qi, Q2, .... Qn, ... are sequences of points in the product space where Q. -n Q, P n P and Q,, counters P,, then Q counters P. Since the graph is closed and since the -image of each point under the mapping is convex, we infer from Kakutani's theorem' that the mapping has a fixed point (i.e., point contained in its image). Hence there is an equilibrium point. In the two-person zero-sum case the "main theorem"2 and the existence of, an equilibrium point are equivalent. In this case any two equilibrium points lead to the-same expectations for the players, but this need not occur in general. [Annotation 7] * The author is indebted to Dr. David Gale for suggesting the use of Kakutani's theorem to simplify the proof and to the A. E. C. for financial support. 'Kakutani, S., Duke Math. J., 8, 457-459 (1941). 2 Von Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, O., The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Chap. 3, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1947.

REMARK ON WEYL'S NOTE "INEQUALITIES BETWEEN THE TWO KINDS OF EIGENVALUES OF A LINEAR TRANSFORMATION" *

By GEORGE POLYA

DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS, STANFORD UNIVERSITY Communicated by H. Weyl, November 25, 1949

In the note quoted above H. Weyl proved a Theorem involving a function so(X) and concerning the eigenvalues aj of a linear transformation A and those, Ki, of A*A. If the Kj and xi = IaiI2 are arranged in descending order,

VOL. 36, 1950 49

Downloaded from https://www.pnas.org by 76.21.47.7 on April 2, 2022 from IP address 76.21.47.7.

---

Source: [Fermat's Library](https://fermatslibrary.com/) — https://fermatslibrary.com/s/equilibrium-points-in-n-person-games. More annotated papers: https://fermatslibrary.com/llms.txt
