
FEBRUARY 2023
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PHYSICS TODAY 45
larger, 6–7 m telescopes, although the cost of manufacturing
the necessary 6 m Schmidt corrector lenses may preclude that
option.
POEMMA is just one of the many probe- class mission con-
cepts submi ed in white papers for Astro2020. The $1.5 billion
cost for probes estimated by Astro2020 means that only one per
decade is aff ordable for the NASA astrophysics budget.
Starship may enable cheaper probes so that more, and more
unconventional ones such as POEMMA, can be developed.
Cheaper, faster, but beware of better
The space- science community can accelerate the Astro2020
program by taking advantage of Starship’s potential for cost
savings, but that approach will require discipline from all in-
volved. “Faster, be er, cheaper” was the mantra of Daniel
Goldin, the NASA administrator from 1992 to 2001, and it led
to, at best, mixed results.
16
Starship seems poised to provide faster and cheaper launch
vehicles. The teams proposing missions will always want to
put all the available mass budget, however large, into bigger
mirrors and more instruments. That line of thinking leads, in
many cases, to large and complex designs that will follow the
expensive scaling of cost with mass that the astronomy com-
munity is used to. Pushing for “be er” could jeopardize the
faster and cheaper goals, so the community will need to de-
velop best practices to restrain scientists’ appetite.
Space agencies will need to monitor for and avoid mission
creep, but doing so will not be easy. Industry and agency mod-
els that predict mission cost often scale cost with mass. Starship
could usher in a new paradigm in which increased mass would
decrease cost. But that won’t be an easy exercise. Because there
is no track record showing whether an approach that uses mass
and volume to cut costs will be successful, that approach trans-
lates initially into higher risk.
Starship caveats
Starship may not reach expectations. It may operate, but at a
much higher cost and at a reduced mass capability, or on- orbit
refueling may not be achieved. The Starship launch costs given
by SpaceX are presumably estimates of the cost to SpaceX, not
the price to a customer, which will be more expensive. Perhaps
most importantly, realizing dramatically lower launch costs de-
pends on rapid and frequent reuse of each Starship, but a mar-
ket for suffi cient launches may not be forthcoming. The antic-
ipated savings promised by Starship also may prove illusory
after careful inspection.
Similar risks, however, apply to almost any new technolog-
ical development. They are thus insuffi cient reasons to not con-
sider what might have the biggest eff ect on astrophysics if the
Starship technology is a success.
The NASA- developed SLS has comparable capabilities to
Starship in terms of mass to low Earth orbit and payload volume.
As such, it provides some backup for Starship. The $800 million
to $2.7 billion cost estimate of an SLS launch, however, would
be a major factor in any mission of even a $5 billion Great
Observatory.
17
Launch costs of that magnitude may put such
an astrophysics mission out of contention, unless politically
mandated. The SLS is fully expendable, so the rate of produc-
tion of more launchers is a critical consideration. The produc-
tion rate for Boeing, the lead contractor for the SLS, is limited
to at most two SLS launchers per year.
18
NASA’s Artemis
human spacefl ight program is expected to take most of the
SLS launch slots over the next several years.
17
Could three
launches over the next decade or so be available for the new
Great Observatories?
Even if Starship works as advertised, extra mass is not with-
out disadvantages. More mass increases the moment of inertia
of the spacecraft and so requires more massive reaction wheels
to point to a target. In addition, station keeping in the popular
Sun– Earth L2 halo orbits either will require proportionately
more propellant or will limit mission lifetimes because of the
extra mass.
Starship will likely be proven or not within the next fi ve
years. That gives NASA time to prepare for a new era of launch
capability by the Astro2020 midterm review. A series of coor-
dinated studies over the next few years to investigate in detail
how Starship might accomplish, accelerate, and expand the
Astro2020 program would prepare NASA’s astrophysics pro-
gram to act if Starship succeeds. But even if Starship fails, the
eff ort that is lost by planning for its success is small when
compared with the potential gains to astronomy.
The authors thank Lee Armus, Jack Burns, Allen Farrington, Tom
Megeath, Joe Silk, and Alexey Vikhlinin for valuable conversations.
The cost information contained in this article is of a budgetary and
planning nature and is intended for informational purposes only. It
does not constitute a commitment on the part of the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory and Caltech.
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